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AbstratThe present artile addresses orret onstrution and funtioning of large omputerbased systems. In view of so many annoying and dangerous system misbehaviors wewant to ask: Can informatiians righteously be aounted for inorretness of systems,will they be able to justify systems to work orretly as intended? We understandthe word justiation in this sense, i.e., for the design of omputer based systems,the formulation of mathematial models of information ows, and the onstrutionof ontrolling software to be suh that the expeted system eets, the absene ofinternal failures, and the robustness towards misuses and maliious external attaksare foreseeable as logial onsequenes of the models.The rigid nature of matter eduates hardware tehnologists to be extremely sensitivetowards hardware failures; they are felt as sensations. So system faults are mostly andinreasingly aused by software. This observation is ruial. Software engineers arepermitted to assume hardware to work orretly, and to exploit this assumption forequally sensitive rigorous low level implementation veriation of software. We willdemonstrate this in a non-selfevident way in partiular for ompilers, beause they areruial to low level implementation orretness of appliation software. At the upperend, software engineers rely on the mahine-independent semantis for their high-levellanguages, but they have to be aware of what kind of implementation orretnessmakes sense and an realistially be guaranteed in their appliation domain. We willreet realisti requirements and introdue the notion of relative orretness and itspreservation, in view of errors whih an be aepted or have to be avoided.Sine more than 40 years, theoretial informatis, software engineering and om-piler onstrution have made important ontributions to orret speiation and alsoto orret high-level implementation of ompilers. But the third step, translation {bootstrapping { of high level ompiler programs into host mahine ode by existinghost ompilers, is as important. So far there are no realisti reipes to lose this gap,although it is known for many years that trust in exeutable ode an dangerouslybe ompromised by Trojan horses in ompiler exeutables, even if they pass strongesttests. Our artile will show how to lose this low level gap. We demonstrate themethod of rigorous syntati a-posteriori ode inspetion, whih has been developedby the researh group Verix funded by the Deutshe Forshungsgemeinshaft (DFG).Keywordsimplementation veriation and orretness, ompiler veriation, preservation of or-retness, a-posteriori-result heking, ode inspetion, omputer based systems, safety,seurity, Trojan horses, trusted program exeution
ZusammenfassungIn der vorliegenden Arbeit behandeln wir die korrekte Konstruktion und Wirkungswei-se groer und siherheitsrelevanter Computer-basierter Systeme. Wir stellen die Frage,ob Informatik, ob Informatiker gerehterweise fur Inkorrektheiten zur Verantwortunggezogen werden konnen, ob sie das rihtige Konstruieren und Funktionieren werdenrehtfertigen konnen. Dabei verstehen wir das Wort Rehtfertigung in diesem Sinn:Der Entwurf eines Systems, das zugrundeliegende mathematish-logishe Modell derInformationsusse und die konstruierte steuernde Software mussen dergestalt sein, dagewunshte Wirkungen, interne Fehlerfreiheit und Robustheit gegen Fehlbedienungenund heimtukishe Attaken von auen als logishe Konsequenzen einzig des mathema-tishen Modells vorhersagbar sind.Hardware-Tehnologen sind aus gutem Grund sehr sensibel fur Hardwarefehler, de-ren Auftreten einer Sensation gleihkommt. Systemausfalle gehen deshalb meist undmit wahsendem Anteil auf gedanklih-logishe Fehler in der Software zuruk. Folgenwir dieser Beobahtung und akzeptieren wir die klare Trennung der Verantwortungs-bereihe zwishen Hardware- und Systemsoftwareingenieur, dann wird klar: Softwa-reengineering darf sih auf korrektes Funktionieren der Hardware verlassen und dieseauh ausnutzen, um mit ahnlih hoher Sensibilitat fur Fehler rigoros den Nahweisder Korrektheit ablaufender Mashinenimplementierungen zu fuhren. Wir werden diesspeziell fur Ubersetzer zeigen, und zwar so, dass Korrektheit nur abhangig ist von kor-rektem Funktionieren der Hardware und der Rihtigkeit gedanklih-logisher Shlusse.Nah oben hin ist mashinenunabhangige Programmiersprahsemantik Gegenstand desKontrakts zwishen Softwareimplementierer und Anwendungsprogrammierer, der aberauh Klarheit hinsihtlih der Art gewunshter Implementierungskorrektheit beinhal-ten muss. Sie muss Sinn mahen und realistish garantiert werden konnen. RelativeProgrammkorrektheit und ihre Erhaltung, in dieser Arbeit eingefuhrt, fasst realistisheAnforderungen auh hinsihtlih zu akzeptierender und zu vermeidender Fehler.Seit uber 40 Jahren haben theoretishe Informatik, Softwareengineering und Uber-setzerkonstruktion wihtige Beitrage zu korrekter Ubersetzungsspezikation und kor-rekter hohersprahliher Ubersetzerimplementierung geleistet. Fur den genauso wihti-gen dritten Shritt, die Ubersetzung (das Bootstrapping) von Compilerprogrammen inden Mashinenode von Wirtmashinen, gibt es bislang keine realistishen Methodenoder Rezepte. Und das, obwohl lange bekannt ist { spatestens seit Ken ThompsonsTuring Award Leture im Jahre 1984 { dass ausfuhrbarer Code durh verstekte Tro-janishe Pferde in Ubersetzerimplementierungen gefahrlih manipuliert werden kann,selbst wenn die Ubersetzer Quellodeinspektionen, Validierung und harteste Tests be-stehen. Im vorliegenden Aufsatz zeigen wir auf, wie diese gefahrlihe Luke geshlossenwerden kann. Die Forshergruppe Verix der Universitaten Karlsruhe, Kiel und Ulm,gefordert von der Deutshen Forshungsgemeinshaft (DFG), hat dazu die Methodeder rigorosen syntaktishen a-posteriori-Code-Inspektion entwikelt.ShlusselworteImplementierungskorrektheit und -verikation, Ubersetzerverikation, Erhaltung vonProgrammkorrektheit, a-posteriori-Resultatprufung, Codeinspektion, Computer-basier-te Systeme, Siherheit, Trojanishe Pferde, zuverlassige Programmausfuhrung
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91 IntrodutionUsers of omputer based systems are often heavily annoyed by errors, failures andsystem rashes. In our every day experiene using programs we observe them to fail,for instane due to lak of memory, programming errors, ompiler bugs, or misusesof optimizing ompilers under wrong assumptions. Although very annoying, we alllive with software errors, but we still hope that appliation programmers, ompileronstrutors, operating system designers and hardware engineers have at least beensensible enough to detet and to signal any suh error. Undeteted errors might haveharmful onsequenes, in partiular if they are intentional, perhaps due to viruses orTrojan Horses.Often the user is aountable, using systems outside their speied domains withouteven reading manuals or doumentation. However, a large number of system misbe-haviors is still due to the system onstrutors themselves, to professionals, omputersientists, informatiians. It is obvious that they should take responsibility as anyprofessional has to. But software onstrutors hardly ever give guarantees for theirproduts. And they are not even enfored to beause ustomers purhase softwareproduts in full awareness of defets. Nevertheless, informatis sientists and produ-ers of omputer based systems are responsible and not allowed to permanently negletthe problem of system misbehaviors in pratie.1.1 Motivation and OutlineSo our artile addresses orret onstrution and funtioning of large omputer basedsystems. In view of so many annoying and dangerous system misbehaviors we want toask (and positively answer) the question: Can informatiians be righteously aountedfor system weaknesses, will they be able to justify systems to work orretly as intended,to be dependable, reliable, robust?Sine hardware turns out to be quite reliable, the question omes down to software,i.e., to abstrat and mathematially treatable omponents of systems. The rigid natureof matter eduates hardware tehnologists to be extremely sensitive towards hardwarefailures; they are felt as sensations. So system faults are mostly and inreasinglyaused by software. This observation is ruial and mathes the lear delimitation ofresponsibilities between hardware and system software engineering. Software engineersare permitted to assume hardware to work orretly, and to exploit this assumptionfor equally sensitive, rigorous low level implementation veriation of software. Onesoftware engineers and appliation programmers an ount on (trust in) the orretnessof their low level mahine implementations and integrated systems, an equal status ofsensitivity also for software faults beomes justiable.That is to say, at the low end, system software engineering meets hardware engineer-ing, and at the upper end, ompiler onstrutors and system software engineers meetappliation programmers and software engineers. They want to express their softwarein problem-oriented languages and rely on mahine independent semantis. Compileronstrutors annot be made responsible for appliation program faults. Atually, aompiler has to be onstruted without any knowledge about the intended meaning ofappliation programs. The ontrat has to be with respet to program semantis. Asa return, the appliation programmer expets orretly implemented mahine exeuta-
10 1 INTRODUCTIONbles. But both, appliation and system programmers have to be aware of what kindsof implementation orretnesses make sense and an realistially be guaranteed. Wewill reet realisti requirements and introdue the notion of relative orretness andits preservation and variants in view of data and program representation and of errorswhih an be aepted or others whih have to be avoided.Although an area of researh and development sine 40 years, realisti languageimplementation, a entral topi in system software engineering, is still a severe gap intrustworthiness. Pratial ompiler onstrution proeeds in three steps: (1) Spei-ation of a ompiling relation from soure language to target mahine ode, (2) im-plementation of the ompiling relation as a ompiler program in an appropriate highlevel system programming language, and (3) bootstrapping the ompiler, i.e., trans-lation of the ompiler soure program into host mahine ode using an existing hostompiler. Theoretial informatis, software engineering and ompiler onstrution haveimportantly ontributed towards orretness of the rst two steps.But how to verify the third low level step? So far there are no realisti reipes tolose this gap, although it is known for many years (at least sine Ken Thompson'sTuring Award leture in 1984) that trust in exeutable ode an dangerously be om-promised by Trojan horses in ompiler exeutables, even if they pass strongest tests.Our artile will show how to lose this low level gap. The Deutshe Forshungsgemein-shaft (DFG) researh group Verix has developed the method of rigorous syntatia-posteriori ode inspetion in order to remove every soure of ruial faults in ini-tial ompilers for appropriate high level system programming languages. The methodemploys multi-pass translation with tightly neighboring intermediate languages and adiagonal bootstrapping tehnique whih eetively is based on the above mentionedorretness assumptions and deliberations. A-posteriori-result heking is appliablefor the onstrution of veried ompiler generators as well, and it is ruial to the de-velopment of strategies to substitute existing system software by proved orret modi-ations.There is a urrent trend for system software to be required open soure, enablingsoure ode srutiny for operating system omponents, networking software and alsofor ompilers and other tools and utilities. This will denitely unveal a lot of bugsand even maliious ode like Trojan horses or so-alled easter eggs. However, we wantto stress, that the open soure idea ruially depends on trusted ompilation. Sourelevel srutiny does not suÆiently guarantee trustworthiness of exeutable software[Tho84, Goe00a, Goe00, Goe00b℄. There are sophistiated and intelligent tehniquesto ompletely hide Trojan horses in binary ompiler exeutables, whih are not partof the alleged soure ode, but might ause unexpeted, arbitrary even atastrophieets if target programs are eventually exeuted. No soure ode srutiny, no sourelevel veriation, no ompiler validation, virtually no test, not even the strong ompilerbootstrap test does help. Note that in this situation it is also very unlikely that any ofthe known seurity tehniques will help, beause not even the appliation programmeran give a guarantee that her/his delivered appliation has not been ompromised byauxiliary software utilities or ompilers used during software onstrution.We do not want to blame or ondemn anybody personally. The problem is enor-mous, very awkward, and in ertain entral areas it seems nearly unreasonable to ask forproblem solutions in depth. However, beause of potential disastrous onsequenes, in-
1.2 Notions Mentioned in the Title 11formatiians must attak the problem and seek for solutions to give rigorous guarantees.And we shall see that in the ruial area of orret ompiler onstrution, informatissiene an ahieve quite a lot. There is a remarkable interplay of informatis as afoundational struture siene and as an engineering siene.Industrial software prodution for realisti safety and seurity ritial appliationsenfores immense heking eorts. The amount of work is apparently unmanageable,and onsequently, it is left undone. That is to say: On the one hand, we observedangerous omissions in industrial pratie. On the other hand, we realize how enormousthe problems are. Thus, informatis siene, in partiular viewed at as an engineeringsiene, has to attak them as problems of basi researh { supported by researhfunding institutions like Deutshe Forshungsgemeinshaft (DFG) or German FederalBoard of Safety and Seurity in Information Tehnology (Bundesamt fur Siherheitin der Informationstehnik, BSI), institutions whih we nd in all states with highsiene and tehnology standards. We are not allowed to leave industry people alonewith their responsibility for neessary eorts whih are seemingly unsurmountable atpresent. It is neessary to learly identify the problems and to work towards methodsfor their rigorous solution whih work out in pratie. Mathematis as the lassialstruture siene helps. Again and again, mathematiians invent ways of gaining andommuniating insights, whih are rigorous and onvining even though or maybe evenbeause they are not ompletely formal. We shall see that in the entral area of orretompiler onstrution and implementation our tehniques of insight an ope withrealisti software tasks, and of ourse then an serve as a model outside the area ofompilers. Atually, it is the too often negleted low level implementation veriation ofso-alled initial ompilers (see setion 10) whih involves a ertain amount of manualheking and proving. For priniple reasons we annot leave all heking work toprogrammed omputers if we do not want to run into iruli vitiosi. Trust in anyexeuted program would further on dangerously and hopelessly depend on auxiliarysoftware of unertain pedigree [JBFB01℄.1.2 Notions Mentioned in the TitleLet us briey explain the notions whih we mentioned in the title of this essay: Infor-matis (Computer Siene in the Anglo-Amerian literature) is the sienti disiplineof design, onstrution and networking and of appliation and programming of om-puters (often alled proessors). Although not the most modern one, this denitionis well stressing the two important areas of work: hardware and software. Computerbased systems (CBS) are engineering systems with embedded omputers, programs,sensors, atuators, loks and onneting hannels in a physial environment [SV96℄.Realisti omputer based systems use to be large, omplex, and safety and/or seurityritial [Lap94℄. The latter means that systems may ause heavy damages to healthand eonomy by unintended (internal) failures and by intended (external) attaks.As a matter of fat, the bare existene of large omputer based systems is justied.We need them. But what about orret onstrution and funtioning of suh systems?Can informatiians be made responsible, be aounted for, will they be able to justifysystems to work orretly as intended? We use the term justiation in this sense,i.e., for the design of omputer based systems, the formulation of mathematial mod-els of information ows in systems and the onstrution of software to be suh that
12 1 INTRODUCTIONthe expeted system eets and the absene of failures and violations are foreseeableas logial onsequenes of the models alone. Not every system has suh substantialdelineable area whih an be justied in this rigorous sense. In our opinion, however,if suh a rigorous treatment is possible, it should be required for high safety and se-urity standards. If we an logially foresee (infer) every desired property, espeiallysafety and seurity properties, then we say that the omputer based system has been(mathematially) proved orret, has been veried. We use the word veriation inthis sense, whereas validation means nding by experiments that a system fullls ourintents. Validation is not our main topi in this essay.1.3 Consistent Chekability of Software Prodution ProessesLarge omputer based systems are essentially ontrolled by embedded proessors andtheir software. General experiene shows that the hardware proessors atually workby far more reliably than software does and hene, the weaknesses of a omputer basedsystems are in most ases due to software problems.Every software prodution (implementation) proess today still has two major gapsin trustworthiness of onsistent hekability, namely the transitions from1. software design to high level soure ode (high level software engineering) and2. from high level ode to integrated exeutable binary mahine ode (realisti om-pilation).Both gaps are under investigation in researh and development sine more than 30years, but nevertheless even realisti ompilation is still a severe gap in trustworthiness[BSI96℄. Stritly speaking, realisti ompilers are not orret and no ompiler has yetsuÆiently been veried. So the question arises whether informatis and in partiulartheoretial omputer siene, programming language theory, ompiler onstrution andsoftware engineering do not have any useful results to help in this situation. They have.And the insights are deep and also pratial. But we have to admit that the results areoften depending on too many ompliated assumptions whih the pratial user hasto hek for in realisti situations. And unfortunately, in pratie this so far requiresmany properly eduated engineers and a lot of mathematial and logial skill.If we seriously look at informatis also as an engineering siene, we ought to demon-strate solutions and to show that the neessary heking an be done in a thorough andonvining way. In partiular, in this essay we will demonstrate a strategi solution tolose the seond gap, that of orret realisti ompilation, whih in turn is neessaryfor a onvining high level software engineering.1.4 DFG-Researh Projet Verix - Veried CompilersCorret realisti ompilation is the major goal of the German joint projet Verixon Corret Compilers of the universities of Karlsruhe (G. Goos, W. Zimmermann),Kiel (W. Goerigk, H. Langmaak) and Ulm (A. Dold, F.W. von Henke). Verix is aDFG-funded researh group sine 1996. The goal is to develop repeatable engineeringmethods for onstruting orret ompilers and ompiler generators for realisti, industrially appliable imperative and objet-oriented soure pro-gramming languages and
1.4 DFG-Researh Projet Verix - Veried Compilers 13 real world target and host proessors whih, by help of mehanial proof support (e.g., by PVS [ORS92℄ or ACL2[KM94℄) and by exploiting the idea of a-posteriori result heking are rigorouslyveried as exeutable host mahine programs and whih nevertheless generate eÆient ode that ompares to unveried ompilers. Verix uses pratially and industrially approved ompiler onstrution methods and the proof methodology supplements ompiler onstrution, not vie versa.Compiler onstrution is ruial to the onstrution of (large) omputer based systems,and orret realisti ompilers are neessary for a onvining onstrution proess oforretly working systems. Systems onsist of hardware and ontrolling software, andsoftware splits in system and appliation software. Compiler programs are system soft-ware, and even ompilers like any other piee of systems or appliations are exeutableby ompiling into binary proessor ode. There is no doubt that it is reasonable torequire ompiling to be orret.
softwarehardware ompilerprogramssystems softwareappliation softwareFigure 1. The entral role of orret ompilersSometimes we use the termini fully orret or fully veried if we want to emphasize thatnot only a mathematially speied ompiling relation CSLTL between soure languageSL and target language TL is proved orret, but that also an exeutable ompilerversion implementing this relation and implemented in binary HML-mahine ode ofa real world host proessor HM is proved orret without depending on any auxiliaryunheked tool exeution. Note that the term fully orret makes sense for arbitrarysoftware as well, whih is mathematially speied on the one hand, and implementedon a mahine on the other.We will make a dierene between the terms proved orret and provably orret.We use provably orret in order to indiate that we are interested to develop methodswhih generate proof douments, often aided by omputers. These douments anrigorously be heked to be proofs1. If the douments are heked, for instane for aonrete ompiler, we use the term proved orret. Of ourse, we have to admit thatheking might bear errors. So proved does not laim absolute truth. But it laims arigorous attempt to gain mathematial ertainty, whih is muh more than many otherresearh areas an ahieve.It is not true, that investigation into orret realisti ompilation does not payo just beause software design and high level software engineering probably show upmany more faults than ompilation. Unless we lose the lower level gap with mathe-matial ertainty, a major goal of Verix , potential inorret ompilation will alwaysritially disturb the reognition of ertainties resp. unertainties in high level software1by more or less skilled informatiians. The required skill varies. Not every heking work requirestrained mathematiians or logiians.
14 1 INTRODUCTIONengineering. Corret realisti ompilation establishes a trustworthy exeution basis forfurther software development.Informatis is well responsible for ompilers with their program semantis and ma-hines. Full veriation of ompilers is manageable and feasible. Compared to pro-gramming language theory and ompiler onstrution pratie, no other disipline ofpratial omputer siene is so well equipped with theory. Investigations in Verixhave brought up ideas and methods to inrementally replae ompilers and to replaeor enapsulate system software omponents by fully veried software.1.5 Levels of Trustworthiness and QualityThe lower level gap due to realisti ompilation has been made publi by governmentalboards like the German BSI, but also in other ountries. In 1989, BSI published IT-safety and seurity levels (of trustworthiness or IT-quality) [ZSI89℄. In Germany, thereare eight levels from Q0 (unsuÆiently heked) up to Q7 (formally veried, proofs andimplementation are performed by oÆially admitted tools).However, an \oÆially admitted" tool (like a ompiler or theorem prover) is notneessarily fully veried. So for instane a ompiler just needs to pass an oÆial vali-dation test suite. It is well-known, that suh tests do not suÆe nor replae orretnessproofs [Dij76℄. OÆial IT-ertiation presriptions like those published by BSI in1989/90/94 [ZSI89, ZSI90, BSI94℄ require:\The ompilers employed must be oÆially validated and be admitted asimplementation tools for Q7-systems by an oÆial evaluation board."The terminus validated reveals that for tools like ompilers the evaluation boards atpresent an only validate for instane by applying oÆial test suites. The boards donot see any other rigorous heking or proof tehnique and hene suspet that one isnot allowed to trust in the orretness of generated mahine ode and hene of anyompiler. Thus, onsequently BSI added the following additional requirement:\The transformations from soure to target ode exeuted by a ompilerprogram on a host mahine must be a-posteriori-hekable (\nahvollziehbar",inspetable)."For this reason ertiation authorities still do not trust in any existing realisti om-piler. Instead, they often perform parallel semantial inspetions of both high levelode and low level mahine ode [Pof95℄, i.e., they hek a-posteriori that the targetode will work as expeted from the soure ode.Suh a ode-inspetion is a rigorous a-posteriori-heking of the target program TLto perform as expeted from the soure program SL, where the target program is theresult of a suessful ompilation of the (well-formed) soure program. The hope isthat this is feasible if the mapping CSLTL (the speiation of the transformation) fromsoure to target programs is \inspetable", and hene that it is suÆient to hek(SL; TL) 2 CSLTLHowever, as long as CSLTL is not proved orret, the heking involves semantial onsid-erations.
15Inspetion resp. a-posteriori-result heking is an old idea [BLR89℄. And we knowthe method from shool mathematis: sine for instane integer division is felt moreerror prone than multipliation, we double-hek the results of division by multiplia-tion. We also use to double-hek the results of linear equations solutions by simplermatrix-vetor-multipliation. By ode inspetion with respet to ompilers we meanthe a-posteriori-result heking of ompiler generated ode. Result-heking is oftenmuh easier that (a-posteriori) veriation. Moreover, it is an interesting observa-tion, that industrial software engineers and ertiation boards trust the tehnique ofa-posteriori-result heking. Although there is a well-established and reasonably devel-oped program veriation theory, it is often not well-appliable to large systems or evenlarge amounts of low level ode. Therefore it is so interesting to observe, both froma theoretial and from a pratial point of view, that realisti sientially foundedfully veried ompiler onstrution has to reah bak also to a-posteriori-heking to asmall, but deisive extent.We will see this later while proving low level ompiler implementation orretness(setion 10) and hene full ompiler orretness. Consequently, sine this is possible andfeasible, already in 1989/90 one of the authors proposed to introdue an even higherIT-safety and seurity level of quality Q8 (Prodution, proof and heking tools arefully veried, not only at high level, but also down to implementations in exeutablebinary mahine ode). Otherwise, the low level gap of realisti ompilation will remainopen forever.2 Code Inspetion in Compiler Constrution ProessesThe Verix -thesis is that after 40 years ompiler onstrution and more than 30 yearssoftware engineering it should no longer be neessary to inspet low level generatedode, not even for safety and seurity ritial software. The new higher quality levelQ8 should be introdued whih is reahing beyond Q7. It should be desirable andrequired for industrial software onstrution, in partiular for realisti ompilers. Weannot entirely avoid manual low level ode inspetion[Fag86℄, however, it is only ne-essary for initial ompiler exeutables whih annot be implemented on behalf of averied bootstrapping ompiler exeutable. The requirement for low level ode inspe-tion only make sense in this respet. In priniple, it should suÆe to perform thiswork exatly one. However, realisti industrial orret ompiler engineering addition-ally needs repeatable methods for onstruting orret initial ompiler implementationsfrom the srath whenever neessary.The goal of orret realisti ompiler onstrution in the view of Verix is thatompiler exeutables on real world host mahines have to be provably orret, andif they are to be used for safety and seurity ritial software implementation, theyhave to be proved orret. That means, that any exeutable binary mahine programsuessfully generated from a well-formed soure program is provably or proved orretwith respet to the soure program semantis. Mahine program orretness may onlydepend on the orretness of soure level appliation programs with respet to their spei-ations,
16 2 CODE INSPECTION IN COMPILER CONSTRUCTION PROCESSES hardware, i.e., target and host proessors to work orretly as desribed in theirinstrution manuals, orret rigorous (mathematial, logial) reasoningAppliation programmers are responsible for the rst assumption and hardware design-ers for the seond. Hene, the ompiler onstrutor only needs onsider the semantis ofwell-formed soure programs and proessors and needs not respet any further intentionof system or appliation programmers.Sine orretness of a ompiler is dened by orretness of its resulting target pro-grams, we only depend on this property whih equally well an be established by a-posteriori result heking. In that ase we sometimes use the term verifying ompiler.Suppose we have a given unveried ompiler HL from SL to TL written (or gener-ated) in some high level host programming language HL. Suppose that HL ompiles viaintermediate languagesSL = IL0; IL1; : : : ; ILm = TL; m  1 :by ompiler passes 1HL ; 2HL ; : : : ; mHL = HLwhih for a well-formed soure program SL may suessfully generate intermediateprograms SL = IL0 ; IL1 ; : : : ; ILm = TL :For all passes  iHL we assume that we are able to write a-posteriori ode inspetionproedures iHL whih we insert into HL:1HL ; 1HL ; 2HL ; 2HL ; : : : ; mHL ; mHL = HL :Syntax and stati semantis of HL has to make sure that the unveried passes  iHLare safely enapsulated suh that their semantis annot interfere with the inspetionproedures nor with any other passes. This method is obviously relying on the existeneof an initial orret and orretly implemented ompiler from HL to the ompiler hostmahine ode, beause it is by no means realisti to assume HL to be a binary mahinelanguage.In pratie, there is no way around an initial orret ompiler exeutable on somehost mahine. Moreover, HL should at least be usable, if not omfortably usable, forsystems programming and writing ompilers.Sine programming languages, their semantis, hardware proessors and their bi-nary mahine odes an aeptedly be modeled using mathematis, orret ompilerspeiation and implementation are in priniple mathematial tasks. Perhaps theyare not that deep, however, they require an exorbitant organization whih is to beonvining and without any logial gap.Hardware engineering has, for good money reasons, developed an error handlingulture by far better than software engineering [Goe96b℄. Hardware errors are sensa-tions, whereas software errors are ommonplae. Sine hardware errors annot easilybe repaired, they bear the risk of high eonomi damage. Thus, hardware engineersseek even for small gaps where faults ould reep in. Seemingly, software errors an
17easily be repaired. But often bug xes make things even worse, and also software errorsbear a high risk.If we assume hardware orret, then we an rely on hardware proessors pro-grammed by orret and orretly implemented software. However, if a proessor isendowed with veried high level programs, but additionally with some non-veriedompilers, then it generally will not work failure-free for the time being. But the goalof fully reliable systems software is not hopeless. We will ome bak to this.3 Towards Trusted Realisti CompilationExperiene in realisti ompiler onstrution shows that in order to onstrut orretompilers we are allowed to restrit ourselves to sequential imperative programminglanguages. For ompilation we need no proess programming nor any reative or real-time behavior; ompilers are sequential (and transformational) and we only depend onthe orretness of their resulting target programs. This insight ruially failitates thefoundational investigation in full ompiler orretness proofs inluding the essential(and so far missing) implementation orretness proofs for exeutable ompiler hostmahine ode. Implementations of realisti ompilers are onstruted in sequential, mostly in imperative languages, even if onurrent proess or real-time languages are to be ompiled.Consequently, we will study orret realisti ompilation for sequential imperative pro-gramming languages, and in partiular we restrit ourselves to transformational pro-grams (f. setion 4), beause we are mainly interested in the input/output relationsdened by program semantis. We need full ompiler orretness proofs only for one initial ompiler per proessor family with identied target and host ma-hine language TML = HML and for one suÆiently high-level soure language SL whih allows for formulatingompilers and system programs.All further ompilers, e.g., optimizing ompilers or those for more expressive sys-tem programming languages SL, ompiler generators, any further systems software likeprovers, proof assistants and proof hekers need no further orret implementationsteps below SL or SL. In partiular, no further mahine ode inspetion is neessary,and exeutable binary versions of these programs an be generated purely mehaniallyfollowing N. Wirth [Wir77℄. The resulting ode is proved to be orret due to a boot-strapping theorem (f. setion 8, also found in [Lan97b, Goe99, GL01a, GL01b℄). As aonlusion we want to stress, that the seond software prodution proess gap (f. se-tion 1.3) an be losed if the Verix -reipes of orret initial ompilers and a-posteriori-program-heking (f. setion 10 and [Lan97, GH98b, Hof98, Lan97b, Lan97a℄) areobeyed.In the ontext of the Verix -projet we will furthermore demonstrate how to developorret ompiler generating tools and how to inorporate even unveried existing toolsin a fully trusted and rigorously proved orret manner [HGG+99, GZG99, GGH+97℄.Moreover, the speiation and veriation system PVS [ORS92℄ is used for mehanial
18 3 TOWARDS TRUSTED REALISTIC COMPILATIONproof support, in partiular for the formalization and veriation of the ompiling spe-iations, and for providing support for high level ompiler implementation veriationusing a transformational approah.In the following we want to fous on how to develop a proved orret and henetrustworthy initial ompiler implementation whih we believe is the foundational basisfor the pratial onstrution of safe and seure, i.e., trustworthy exeutable software.3.1 Three Steps towards Fully Corret CompilersIn his work on Piton's veried translation [Moo88, Moo96℄ J S. Moore reommendsthree steps in order to present a onvining orretness proof of a ompiler written (orimplemented) in exeutable binary host mahine ode HML:1. Speiation of a ompiling relation C between abstrat soure and target lan-guages SL and TL, and ompiling (speiation) veriation w.r.t. an appropriatesemantis relation v between language semantis [[  ℄℄ SL, [[  ℄℄ TL.2. Implementation of a orresponding ompiler program HL in a high level hostlanguage HL lose to the speiation language, and high level ompiler imple-mentation veriation (w.r.t. C and to program representations 'SLSL0 and 'TLTL0).3. Implementation of a orresponding ompiler exeutable HML written in binaryhost mahine language HML, and low level ompiler implementation veriation(with respet to [[ HL ℄℄ HL and program representations 'SL0SL00 and 'TL0TL00).If we work through every step, then HL resp. HML is a orret or veried ompiler(implementation). If we want to stress that a orretness proof has been ahieved evenfor a ompiler exeutable like HML on a real proessor, then we sometimes all it fullysemantisrelation vompilingrelation Chigh level ompilerimplementation HLlow level ompilerimplementation HML
abstrat programsonrete programsonrete programsrepr. as HML-datarepr. as HL-data
semantis spaes SemTLTLSLSL0 TL0TL00
'TLTL0[[  ℄℄ TL'TL0TL00
[[  ℄℄ SL
[[ HML ℄℄ HML
v
C[[ HL ℄℄ HL'SLSL0SL00'SL0SL00
SemSL
Figure 2. Three steps for orret ompiler implementation HMLorret (veried) as informally explained before. Figure 2 informally outlines the threeessential steps that we have to work through for the onstrution and veriation offully orret ompilers, and in partiular of fully orret initial ompiler exeutables.We will make everything shown in this diagram preise in the following setions 4 and5, and in partiular we refer to setion 5.3.1, whih disusses Figure 2 preisely.
194 Transformational ProgramsWe model the semantis of transformational programs by partial relations (or multi-valued partial funtions) f between input domains Di and (not neessarily dierent)output domains Do . Thus, a program semantis is a subsetf  Di Dowhih we often also will write as f 2 Di * Do (= 2DiDo) or as Di f* Do ; sometimeswe also use f : Di * Do . In ase f is single-valued, we may also use ! instead of*. We use "; " to denote the well-known semantial relational omposition, i.e., if f1 :D1 * D2 and f2 : D3 * D4, then f1 ; f2 =def f (d1; d4) j 9 d2 2 D2 \D3 s:t: (d1; d2) 2f1 and (d2; d4) 2 f2 g 2 D1 * D4. Data or elements are often program or memorystates or pairs of program and memory states (sometimes alled ongurations withontrol and data ow omponents) whih we simply all states as well.Data in Di and Do are onsidered regular or non-erroneous. In order to handleirregular data, i.e., nite and innite errors, we assume that every data domain D isextended by an individually assoiated disjoint non-empty error set 
, i.e.,D
 =def D [ 
andD \
 = ;. For every transformational program semantis f we assume an extendedversion f 2 Di
 * Do
whih we denote by the same symbol f unless this will ause ambiguities. We haveDi
 = Di [ 
i and Do
 = Do [ 
o.Errors are nal. No omputation will ever reover from an error 2. Thus, we require(the extended) f to be error strit, i.e., f to be total on 
i and f (
i)  
o. However,we have to respet a further phenomenon. Errors are of essentially dierent types.They are either unavoidable and we have to aept them, like for instane mahineresoure violations, or they are unaeptable and thus to be avoided. We will allowunaeptable errors to ause unpreditable (or haoti) onsequenes. In order tomodel this phenomenon, we partition 
 in a non-empty set A  
 of aeptable and anon-empty set U =def 
 n A of unaeptable or haoti errors. So we require
i = Ai [ Ui and 
o = Ao [ Uoand a strong error stritness, namely that f is total on 
i (and thus on Ai and Ui) andf (Ai)  Ao and f (Ui)  Uo :The error sets 
 are supposed to ontain a partiular standard error element ?whih is to model innite omputation (divergene). So in partiular we have ?o 2
o, and for extended program semantis f we additionally require (d;?o) 2 f orequivalently ?o 2 f(d) whenever there is a non-terminating (innite) omputation off starting with d 2 Di
.Thus, we model transformational program semantis by strongly error strit ex-tended relations between extended input and output domains, and we additionallyrequire them to meet the above ondition for innite omputations.2Note that exeptions are not errors in our sense. We think of exeptions as speial ases of non-loalregular ontrol ow.
20 4 TRANSFORMATIONAL PROGRAMS4.1 Corret ImplementationLet fs be a soure and ft a target program semantis. In the following we will explainwhen ft orretly implements fs. This requires data representation relations i 2Dsi 
 * Dti
 and o 2 Dso
 * Dto




i Figure 3. Soure and target program semantis fs; ftand data representations i ; oDenition 4.1 (Corret implementation or renement). ft is said to be a or-ret implementation or renement of fs relative i and o and assoiated error setsi ( i ; ft ) (d)  ( fs ; o) (d) [ Ato (1)holds for all d 2 Dsi where fs (d)  Dso [ Aso (whih is equivalent to (fs; o) (d) Dto [ Ato, beause o is strongly error strit in both diretions).For any target program omputation, the outome d00 in Dto




ifs 2 Sems :ft 2 Semt : Figure 4. Commutative diagram ex-pressing orret implementationimplementation diagrams both vertially and horizontally, whih is a very importantfat for pratial software engineering and ompiler generation.There are some variations of orret (relative) implementation as of Denition 4.1,whih we would like to disuss: We speak of orret aeptable implementation resp. ofa orret regular implementation or renement i; 6= (i ; ft) (d)  (fs; o)(d) [Ato (aeptable); 6= (i ; ft) (d)  (fs; o)(d) (regular)
4.2 Preservation of Relative Corretness 21holds for all d 2 Dsi where ; 6= fs (d)  Dso [Aso resp. ; 6= fs (d)  Dso . But note that{ in ontrast to the dierent program orretness notions (f. setion 4.2) { all threeimplementation orretness notions are independent; neither one implies the other. Itis remarkable, however, that onrete orretness proofs turn out to be of less om-plexity if ? is supposed to be unaeptable, i.e., if we prove variants of orret regularimplementation [MOW00, Wol01℄. If ? is supposed aeptable, then our experieneshows, that we have to haraterize greatest xed points exatly and to additionally useomputational or xed point indution in order to prove variants of orret aeptableimplementation, e.g., preservation of partial orretness [Goe00, Goe00b℄.4.2 Preservation of Relative CorretnessIt is an important observation, that we an exatly haraterize orret implementationby preservation of relative orretness [Wol01℄, whih generalizes Floyd's and Hoare'snotions of partial respetively total program orretness. Let f 2 Di
 * Do
 be aprogram semantis and let   Di and 	  Do be prediates, i.e., subsets of regulardata.Denition 4.2 (Relative program orretness). f is alled (relatively) orretwith respet to (pre- and post-onditions)  and 	 (h i f h	 i for short), if()  	 [ Ao (3)If there is no ambiguity, and if the impliit parameters are lear from the ontext, wewill sometimes leave out the word relative and simply speak of program orretness. Thefollowing theorem says that ft orretly implements fs if and only if relative orretnessof fs implies relative orretness of ft for all pre- and post-onditions  and 	.Theorem 4.1 (Preservation of relative orretness). ft orretly implements fs( i; ft w fs; o ) if and only ifh i fs h	 i =) h i() i ft h o(	) ifor all   Dsi and 	  Dso .Proof. Only if: Let fs(d)  Dso [ Aso imply (i; ft)(d)  (fs; o)(d) [ Ato for all d 2 Dsiand let fs()  	 [ Aso. Claim: ft(i())  o(	) [ Ato. In order to show this, letd 2 . Then fs(d)  	 [Aso  Dso [Aso. Hene,ft(i(d))  o(fs(d)) [ Ato o(	 [Aso) [ Ato= o(	) [ Ato :If: Let fs()  	 [ Aso imply ft(i())  o(	) [ Ato for all   Dsi and 	  Dso ,and let fs(d)  Dso [Aso. Claim: (i; ft)(d)  (fs; o)(d) [ Ato. For this, let  =def fdgand 	 =def fs(d) \ Dso . Then fs() = fs(d) = (fs(d)\Dso) [ (fs(d)\Aso)  	 [ Aso.So (i; ft)(d)  o(fs(d) \Dso) [ Ato (fs; o)(d) [ Ato : ut
22 4 TRANSFORMATIONAL PROGRAMSNote that this theorem remains valid even if we relax strong error stritness; weatually need not require i and o and their inverses to be total on error sets. We onlyneed that they respet the partition in aeptable and unaeptable errors. However,we still prefer data representation relations to be total on error sets (in both diretions).Again, we may disuss variations of the notion of relative program orretness,i.e., aeptable program orretness resp. regular program orretness with respet topre-onditions   Di and post-onditions 	  Do :h i f h	 ia i ; 6= f (d)  	 [Ao (aeptable)h i f h	 ireg i ; 6= f (d)  	 (regular)respetively hold for all d 2 . Note that regular program orretness implies aept-able program orretness, whih implies relative program orretness. Furthermore,orret aeptable resp. regular implementation is equivalent to preservation of a-eptable resp. regular program orretness, i.e., ft orretly aeptably resp. regularlyimplements fs if and only ifh i fs h	 ia =) h i() i ft h o(	) ia (aeptable)h i f h	 ireg =) h i() i ft h o(	) ireg (regular)respetively holds for all   Dsi and 	  Dso .4.3 Classial Notions of Corret ImplementationIn whih sense does relative or aeptable or regular program orretness generalizethe lassial notions of partial or total program orretness? Let f be an original, i.e.,unextended program semantis f 2 Di * Doand let   Di and 	  Do be pre- and post-onditions, respetively. f is alledpartially orret w.r.t.  and 	 ( fg f f	g for short), if f()  	. f is alled totallyorret w.r.t.  and 	 ([℄ f [	℄ for short), if f is partially orret w.r.t.  and 	, i.e.,f()  	, and additionally the domain domf of f omprises , i.e., domf  .Let us now hoose the same partiular error sets A = Ai = Ao =def fag andU = Ui = Uo =def fug for both domains Di and Do with ? 2 fa; ug and 
 = 
i =
o =def A[ U , and extend f tof ext 2 Di
 * Do
 by f ext =def f [ ((Di n domf )  f?g) [ id
 :f ext is strongly error strit, regardless of ? being onsidered aeptable (Ai = Ao =deff?g; Ui = Uo =def fug) or unaeptable (Ai = Ao =def fag; Ui = Uo =def f?g).Partial and Total Program CorretnessRelative and aeptable orretness are equivalent to partial orretnessh i f ext h	 i () h i f ext h	 ia () fg f f	gif ? = a is onsidered aeptable, and relative, aeptable and regular orretness areequivalent to total orretness, if ? = u is onsidered unaeptable:h i f ext h	 i () h i f ext h	 ia () h i f ext h	 ireg () [  ℄ f [ 	 ℄ :







Figure 5. Classial orret implementation versus preservation of relative orretness.Consider a lassial unextended implementation diagram (a). If we extend fs and ftas explained before, and if we extend the data representation relations i and o byexti =def i [ id
 respetively exto =def o [ id
 as well, then we get the extendeddiagram (b). exti ; f extt w f exts ; exto () i; ft  fs; oexatly expresses preservation of partial program orretness. On the other hand, if weonsider ? unaeptable, thenexti ; f extt w f exts ; exto () (i ; ft) j domfs;o  fs ; oand domi ;ft  domfs ;oexpresses exatly the lassial preservation of total orretness.Hene, it is justied to transfer the terms total and partial to extended funtions orrelations f ext , and we may use the words \orret total (resp. partial) implementation"instead of \orret regular (resp. relative) implementation". Also, we may replae\regular (resp. relative) program orretness" again by \total (resp. partial) programorretness".The lassial software engineering notion of orret implementation as propagatedin many (also formal) software engineering approahes like for instane in VDM (Vi-enna Development Method) is preservation of total program orretness. We should,however, keep in mind that resoures might well exhaust while mahine programs areexeuted on real target mahines, so that a ompiled program semantis ft an ingeneral not be proved to meet the requirements of orret implementation in the lat-ter sense. Preservation of relative orretness gives us the neessary means to deneadequate notions of orret implementation also for realisti orret ompilation.4.4 ComposabilityWe mentioned that omposability (transitivity) of orret implementation is ruialfor modular software onstrution and veriation, and in partiular for stepwise om-pilation and ompiler onstrution and implementation. In the following we provevertial and horizontal transitivity, i.e., that we may (vertially) deompose orret








i o ; o 0i ; i 0 Figure 6. Vertial omposition expressedby ommutative diagrams: If the inner di-agrams are ommutative, then so is theouter one.Proof. Let   Dsi , 	  Dso and let h i fs h	 i.Then, due to Theorem 4.1, we have h i() i ft h o(	) i (ommutativity of the upperdiagram) and h i 0(i()) i ft0 h o 0(o(	)) i (ommutativity of the lower diagram forpre-ondition i() and post-ondition o(	)). But the latter just meansh (i ; i 0) () i ft0 h (o ; o 0) (	) iwhih ompletes the proof due to equivalene of orret implementation and preserva-tion of (relative) orretness (Theorem 4.1). utTheorem 4.3 (Horizontal transitivity of orret implementation). If ft orret-ly implements fs, and if ft0 does so for fs0, then ft; ft0 orretly implements fs; fs0 .








fs; fs0 Figure 7. Horizontal omposi-tion expressed by ommutativediagrams: If the inner diagramsare ommutative, then so is theouter one.Proof. Let i ; ft w fs; o and (4)o ; ft0 w fs0 ; o 0 and (5)(fs; fs0) (d)  Ds0o [As0o (6)Claim: (i ; ft; ft0) (d)  (fs; fs0 ; o 0) (d) [At0o .










i ; i 0 o ; o 0Figure 8. Weak vertial omposability:If the inner diagrams are ommutative andft and ft00 appropriately oinide, then theouter diagram is ommutative as well.In order to ensure that i ; i 0 and o ; o 0 are error strit in both diretions, we requirethe intermediate error sets to agree, i.e., Ati = At00i , U ti = U t00i , Ato = At00o , and U to = U t00o .
26 4 TRANSFORMATIONAL PROGRAMSFurthermore, letIi =def i(Dsi 




 \ o0 1(Dt0o 
)  Dto
 \Dt00o 




 ftft00idIi Sine ft jIiIo  ft00 j IiIo , it is immediately lear that thisdiagram is ommutative. Thus, the outer diagram is om-mutative due to vertial omposition Theorem 4.2. utFor horizontal omposition, let ommutative (inner) diagrams and the outer dia-gram with sequential ompositions fs; fs0 respetively ft; ft0 be as in Figure 9. Again,for strong error stritness reasons, we require the intermediate error sets to agree, i.e.,Aso = As0i , U so = U s0i , Ato = At0i , and U to = U t0i .Ds0i 
Dt0i 













It =def ft(i(Dsi 
)) \ f 1t0 (Dt0o 
)  Dto
 \Dt0i 
 :denote appropriate restritions of (intermediate) domain and odomain of soure andtarget semantis, respetively. Then, if the data representation relation o is ontainedin i 0 on Is  It, we an prove the following weak horizontal omposition orollary:Corollary 4.2. If the two inner diagrams of Figure 9 are ommutative, if the in-termediate error sets agree, and if o jIsIt  i 0 jIsIt, then the outer diagram isommutative as well.




 idIsidIt Sine o jIsIt  i 0 jIsIt , it is immediately lear thatthis diagram is ommutative. Thus, the outer diagram isommutative due to horizontal omposition Theorem 4.3.utBoth more general theorems have been proved by onstrution of ommutative ou-pling diagrams. In both ases, we have been looking for as weak as possible onditionsunder whih we are allowed to ompose ommutative diagrams. Note, however, thatwe might sometimes be able to prove ommutativity of more omplex diagrams fromommutativity of onstituent diagrams even under weaker assumptions. Note also,that we might be able to prove orret implementation for a omposite diagram, eventhough one or more omponent diagrams are not ommutative.Let us nally note, that every theorem and orollary in this setion does hold forany of our notions of orret implementation, i.e., not only for orret relative (partial)implementation but also for orret aeptable and orret regular (total) implemen-tation. We have dened a family of orret implementation notions whih allows formore elaborated and sophistiated adjustments to whatever the pratial requirementsfor orret implementation really are. And the essential (proof engineering) quality ofomposability and hene modularizeability is guaranteed for any hoie.5 Corret Compiler ProgramsMain onstituents of a programming language are its set L of abstrat syntatialprograms and its language semantis [[  ℄℄ L : L  ! SemL, a partial funtion from Linto an assoiated semantis spae SemL. The domain of [[  ℄℄ L is the set of so-alledproper or well-formed programs. In ase of a well-formed  and of sequential imperativeprogramming languages we are aiming at, [[ ℄℄ L an be dened as a relation betweenextended input and output data domains DLi
 and DLo
 as disussed in the previoussetions: [[ ℄℄ L 2 SemL =def (DLi
 * DLo




ifs 2 SemSL :ft 2 SemTL : Figure 10. Corret implementation forsequential imperative programsData representations i and o and assoiated aeptable and unaeptable error setsare impliit parameters of w. Note also, that w impliitly denes if we mean preser-vation of relative (partial), aeptable or regular (total) orretness. We have not yetxed any one of these parameters.
28 5 CORRECT COMPILER PROGRAMS5.1 Compiling SpeiationsEvery ompiler program establishes a mapping between soure and target programs,atually between soure and target program representations like for instane haratersequenes on the one and linkable objet ode format on the other hand. In order to talkabout this mapping abstratly and to relate soure and target programs semantially,we assume that we have or an dene a ompiling (or transformation) speiationC : SL * TL ;a mathematial relation between abstrat soure and target programs. C might begiven by a losed indutive denition, more or less onstrutive, or by a set of bottom-up rewrite rules applied by a term or graph rewrite system (e.g., bottom up rewritesystems, BURS [PLG88℄) as for instane used in rule-based ode generators.SemTLvC [[  ℄℄ TLSL[[  ℄℄ SL TLSemSL Figure 11. Corretness of the ompiling speia-tion CDenition 5.1. We all C orret, if and only if for any well-formed soure programs 2 SL, every assoiated target program t 2 C(s) is a orret implementation of s,i.e., if and only if the diagram in Figure 11 is ommutative in the sense( [[  ℄℄ SL  1 ; C )  (v ; [[  ℄℄ TL  1 ) :Note that we do not require C to be dened for all well-formed SL-programs, and wewill also not require this property for ompiler program semantis. Due to resourerestritions of nite host mahines we won't be able to prove it for ompiler programs,anyway, beause realisti soure languages ontain arbitrarily large programs.For any two programming languages SL and TL there is an impliitly given naturalorret ompiling speiation that simply relates any well-formed soure program inSL to every of its orret implementations in TL:CC =def [[  ℄℄ SL ; v ; [[  ℄℄ TL  1The following alulation shows, that CC is orret (Atually, if we only onsider well-formed programs, it is the largest orret ompiling speiation.):([[  ℄℄ SL  1; CC) = ([[  ℄℄ SL  1; [[  ℄℄ SL ;v; [[  ℄℄ TL  1)  (v; [[  ℄℄ TL  1)But how is a orret C related to CC in general? Of ourse, CC 6 C (C might evenbe empty, e.g., for the pathologial ompiler whih fails on every soure program).Restrited to well-formed soure programs, C is a subset of CC. However, in general Cmight relate non well-formed SL-programs (whih have no semantis) to TL-programs.Perhaps well-formedness is hard to deide or even undeidable. So ompilers sometimesgenerate or have to generate target ode also for improper soure programs without
5.1 Compiling Speiations 29expliitly signaling an error. The user should be areful, keep this in mind and avoidnon-well-formed ompiler inputs. In any ase, in general C 6 CC as well.Hene, so far C is unrelated to CC, and so will be any orret implementation ofC. This observation suggests to view at the program sets SL and TL as data domainsand extend them by partiular unaeptable error elements. This will allow us to alsoformally express in partiular the well-formedness preondition that soure programshave to fulll if they are to be orretly ompiled. We will do so also for the semantisspaes SemSL and SemTL.For SL
 and TL
 we need an unaeptable error nwf (for \non-well-formed") in USLand UTL, and for Sem
SL and Sem
TL we need an unaeptable error uds (for \undenedsemantis") in USemSL and USemTL . C; CC; [[  ℄℄ SL ; [[  ℄℄ TL andv are extended so that theseartiial error elements are related to eah other and to non-well-formed programs inSL and TL. Again we denote the extended relations by the same symbols.
v
SemTLv [[  ℄℄ TLSL TLSemSL C;CC[[  ℄℄ SL
(a) Sem
TLv [[  ℄℄ TLTL
Sem
SL C;CCSL






 Figure 13. Corretness denition for extended ompilingspeiationsTheorem 5.1 (Corret ompiling speiations). A ompiling speiation C isorret, if and only if it is a orret implementation of CC.Proof. If: by Figure 13, Figure 12 (b) and vertial omposition.
30 5 CORRECT COMPILER PROGRAMSOnly if: Let s 2 SL and CC (s)  TL [ ATL (), and let t 2 C (s). We haveto show: t 2 CC (s) [ ATL. First note that s is well-formed, i.e., has semantis[[s ℄℄ SL 2 SemSL, beause otherwise t and CC (s) would be the unaeptable errornwf 62 TL [ ATL whih ontradits (). If t 2 ATL, then we are done. t 2 UTL isimpossible, beause t would be nwf and hene s not well-formed. So let t 2 TL.Then, ( [[s ℄℄ SL; t ) 2 ( [[  ℄℄  1SL ; C ). Due to orretness of C (Figure 12 (a)) we have( [[s ℄℄ SL; t ) 2 (v ; [[  ℄℄ 1TL ), that is to say (s; t ) 2 ( [[  ℄℄ SL ; v ; [[  ℄℄ 1TL ). But thelatter is exatly the denition of CC, hene we have t 2 CC (s). ut5.2 Corret Compiler ProgramsIn order to prove that a ompiler program (sometimes also alled ompiler implemen-tation or simply ompiler) is orret, we want to relate its semantis to the ompilingspeiation. It is often a good advie to write a ompiler in its own soure language.In general, though, the ompiler will be implemented in a high level or a low levelmahine host language HL with semantis spaeSem
HL = (DHLi 
 * DHLo 
 )
 :If we want to all an HL-program h a ompiler from SL to TL, then we need represen-tation relations 's and 't to represent SL- and TL-programs as data in SL0 
 =def DHLi 
resp. in TL0 
 =def DHLo 




[[  ℄℄ TLSL
 TL
v[[ h ℄℄ HLCC
Sem
TLSem
SL[[  ℄℄ SL [[  ℄℄ TL0[[  ℄℄ SL0 Figure 14. Compiler programs re-lated to ompiling speiations. Ifthe lower diagram is ommutativeas well, we all h a orret om-piler programThe situation is as desribed in Figure 14. However, in order to treat languagesof onrete program representations like SL' and TL' as reasonable programming lan-guages, we require that [[  ℄℄ SL0 =def ' 1s ; [[  ℄℄ SL and [[  ℄℄ TL0 =def ' 1t ; [[  ℄℄ TL are single-valued partial funtions. Thus, any onrete representation of a well-formed SL- orTL-program has a unique semantis.Denition 5.2 (Corret ompiler program). We all h a orret ompiler pro-gram, i [[ h ℄℄ HL w CC, i.e., i [[ h ℄℄ HL is a orret implementation of CC.If h is a orret ompiler, then the lower diagram of Figure 14 and, due to vertialomposition, also the outer diagram is ommutative. Atually, we ould equivalentlyhave required w-ommutativity of the outer diagram. This would entail ommutativityof both inner diagrams and in partiular of the lower diagram (the upper diagram isommutative anyway).
5.2 Corret Compiler Programs 31The proof of the latter remark is a bit more detailed, but analogous to thatof Theorem 5.1: Let s 2 SL and 'TLTL0 ( CC (s))  TL0 [ ATL0 (), and let 0t 2[[s ℄℄ SL('SLSL0(s)). We have to show 0t 2 'TLTL0 ( CC (s)) [ ATL0 . First note that sis well-formed, i.e., has semantis [[s ℄℄ SL. Otherwise, CC would assign nwf 2 UTLto s whih ontradits (). If 0t 2 ATL0 , we are done. If 0t 2 UTL0 , then byommutativity of the outer diagram [[s ℄℄ SL 2 (v; [[  ℄℄ TL0) 1(UTL0) = fudsg on-traditing well-formedness of s. So let 0t 2 TL0. Commutativity of the outer dia-gram means ([[  ℄℄  1SL0 ; [[h ℄℄ HL) ([[s ℄℄ SL)  (v; [[  ℄℄  1TL0 ) ([[s ℄℄ SL) [ ATL0 and therefore0t 2 (v; [[  ℄℄  1TL0 ) ([[s ℄℄ SL) = 'TLTL0 ([[  ℄℄  1TL (v ([[s ℄℄ SL))). Sine 0t and [[s ℄℄ SL are regu-lar in TL0 resp. SemSL, we have 0t 2 'TLTL0 (CC (s)) by denition of CC. utAny orret ompiler program h indues an assoiated orret extended ompilingspeiation C =def ('s; [[ h ℄℄ HL ;' 1t ) : SL
 * TL






CC[[ h ℄℄ HLC
SL
 TL
id Figure 15. Compiler programs and ompiling spe-iations. Due to vertial omposition, a orret im-plementation of a orret ompiling speiation is aorret ompilerThat is to say: A ompiler program is orret, if and only if it is the orretimplementation of a orret ompiling speiation.But what happens, if we apply a orret ompiler program to the representation ofa well-formed soure program? It should not be a surprise, that we will get at most arepresentation of a orret implementation of the soure program:Theorem 5.2. Let h be a orret ompiler program and let 0s 2 's(s) be the repre-sentation of a well-formed SL-program. Then any regular 0t 2 [[ h ℄℄ HL (0s) representsa orret implementation t of s.Proof. Sine s is well-formed, CC(s)  TL and hene, sine h is a orret ompilerprogram, we have ('s; [[ h ℄℄ HL ) (s)  (CC;'t) (s) [AHLo : Thus,0t 2 [[ h ℄℄ HL (0s)  [[ h ℄℄ HL ('s(s))  (CC;'t) (s) [ AHLo :But 0t is regular, i.e., 0t 62 AHLo . Therefore, 0t 2 (CC;'t) (s) : So 0t 2 't(t) for at 2 CC(s), whih means [[t ℄℄ TL w [[s ℄℄ SL . ut
32 5 CORRECT COMPILER PROGRAMSLet us all a onrete SL'- or TL'-datum 0s or 0t a well-formed SL'- or TL'-program,if it represents a well-formed SL- or TL-program. Then 0s or 0t have semantis [[0 ℄℄ SL0respetively [[0 ℄℄ TL0 . Thus, it is dened when 0t orretly implements 0s. Aordingto Theorem 5.2, every regular result 0t 2 [[ h ℄℄ HL (0s) of a orret ompiler h, appliedto a well-formed 0s, orretly implements 0s.That is to say: A orret ompiler, applied to a well-formed soure program, returnsat most orret implementations of that soure program.5.3 Disussion and First SummaryWe want to summarize some important observations and give some additional expla-nations. In partiular, we will relate the denitions and notions dened in the previoussetions to our informal sketh of a onsientious ompiler orretness proof as of setion3.1 and in partiular of Figure 2. Moreover, we will disuss MKeeman's T-diagramnotation, give some remarks on the dierene between orret implementation of userprograms and of ompiler programs, and nally we want to disuss orret implemen-tation for optimizing ompilers.5.3.1 Preise View at the Three StepsLet us rst ome bak to the diagram shown in Figure 2 (page 18) in setion 3.1. In theprevious setions (4, 5.1 and 5.2) we have exatly dened every single notion mentionedin setion 3.1 and, hene, we now know preisely every onjeture we have to prove inorder to implement an SL to TL-ompiler orretly as an exeutable program on a hostproessor HM.In Figure 2, every data set, program set and semantis spae, every program se-mantis, data representation, program representation, semantis funtion, ompilingspeiation, ompiler semantis and semantis relation has to be appropriately ex-tended by unaeptable and aeptable error elements. The following ommutativediagrams (Figure 16 and 17) preisely express that C is a orret ompiling speia-tion, and that HL respetively HML are orret ompiler programs.Sem
TLTL
 3 TLTL0 
 = DHL
o 3 TL0'TLTL0
[[  ℄℄ TL[[  ℄℄ SLSem
SL'SLSL0SL 2 SL

[[ HML ℄℄ HML
v
C[[ HL ℄℄ HL TL00 
 = DHML
o 3 TL00SL0 2 DHL
i = SL0 
SL00 2 DHML
i = SL00 
 'TL0TL00 = oHLHMLiHLHML = 'SL0SL00Figure 16. This diagram is again illustrating the three steps for orret ompilerimplementation as of Figure 2 on page 18
5.3 Disussion and First Summary 33Dso
Dto
o[[ SL ℄℄ SLi [[ TL ℄℄ TL
[[ SL ℄℄ SL 2 Sem
SL : Dsi 
[[ TL ℄℄ TL 2 Sem
TL : Dti
Figure 17. This diagram is again illustrating orret implementation as of Figure 4on page 20. Note that [[SL ℄℄ SL = [[SL0 ℄℄ SL0 = [[SL00 ℄℄ SL00 and analogously for TLPrograms and their representations have equal semantis. But we should expliitlynote that in diagram 16 the ompiler program HML is not a representation of HL.These two programs have in general dierent semantis, but the former is a orretimplementation of the latter.5.3.2 T-Diagram NotationMKeeman's so-alled T-diagrams allow to illustrate the eets of iterated ompilerappliations in an intuitive way. We use them as shorthand notations for partiulardiagrams as of Figure 18.
'TLTL0TL0
 = DHLo 





SL[[  ℄℄ SL [[  ℄℄ TL0[[  ℄℄ SL0DHLi 
 = SL0
 [[ HL0 ℄℄ HL0 = [[ HL ℄℄ HL'SLSL0 Figure 18. The situation whih wewill abbreviate by MKeeman's T-diagramsReall that CC is the natural orret ompiling speiation from SL to TL. Well-formed programs and their (syntatial) '-representations have equal semantis, andHL0 2 'HLHL0 (HL) is a well-formed HL'-program ompiling syntatial SL'-programs tosyntatial TL'-programs. HL' is the domain of perhaps more onrete syntatialrepresentations of HL-programs. In this situation we use the T-diagram (Figure 19) as
τHLSL
HL
TL Figure 19. MKeeman's T-diagram as a short-hand for theabove situationan abbreviation for the diagram in Figure 18. However, we have to keep in mind that theonrete situation is a bit more involved, that the T-diagrams do not expliitly expressruial dierenes between various program representations. We need to distinguishprograms, program semantis and (syntatial) program representations in order tosuÆe requirements from pratie. We annot put pratitioners short by elegant buttoo nebulous idealizations.
34 5 CORRECT COMPILER PROGRAMS5.3.3 Corret Implementation versus Corret Compiler ImplementationIf we bootstrap ompiler programs, we have in general to distinguish between twodierent notions of orret implementation. Soure programs are to be orretly im-plemented by target programs (relating soure to target programs) on the one hand,and the ompiler itself is to be orretly implemented on the host mahine (whihrelates the ompiler soure program to the ompiler mahine program).Error behavior and required parameterization of appliation programs SL, TL andtheir representations SL0 , TL0 , SL00 , TL00 are in general of a dierent nature and inde-pendent of the expeted error behavior and required parameterization for the ompiler,i.e., for the speiation C and ompiler programs HL, HML and their syntatial rep-resentations.For instane, let us assume SL to be a proess programming language. The proessprogrammer would not like to witness any unertainty nor error at omputation timeof soure programs SL respetively SL0 , SL00 . That is soure programs are written suhthat ; 6= [[SL ℄℄ SL (dsi )  Dso (11)holds whenever SL is applied to an input dsi 2 Dsi n [[SL ℄℄ SL 1 (U so ) outside the domainof omputations whih possibly end in unaeptable errors. But this involves regulartermination and hene total orretness of SL whih the proess programmer requiresto be preserved for any orret implementation TL. He/she wants that; 6= [[TL ℄℄ TL (dti)  Dto (12)holds whenever the target program TL is applied upon the representation dti 2 i (dsi ),dsi 62 [[SL ℄℄ SL 1 (U so ), of the orresponding input. Corret regular (total) implementa-tion together with (11) guarantees (12), beause due to setion 4.1, we have; 6= [[TL ℄℄ TL (dti)  o([[SL ℄℄ SL (dsi ))  Dto :On the other hand, the same proess programmer will (and in general has to) a-ept ompile time error reports, like for instane HM-memory overow, while SL isompiled to TL, i.e., while the ompiler mahine implementation HML is exeuted andapplied upon a (syntatial) representation SL00 of the soure program SL. With re-spet to ompilation, the proess programmer wants a guarantee at exeution time ofTL00 whenever HML has sueeded on HM and has generated the target program rep-resentation TL00 , whih means that (12) is established by suessful exeution of theompiler implementation HML.Note that there are no obvious natural mappings between the error sets Aso, U so ,Ato, U to ruial for the orret implementation of soure programs by target programson the one hand, and the error sets ATL0 =def AHLo , UTL0 =def UHLo , ATL00 =def AHMLo andUTL00 =def UHMLo ruial for the orret implementation notion for generating the ompilermahine exeutable HML on the other hand. We have to distinguish these two orretimplementation relations.
5.3 Disussion and First Summary 355.3.4 Notes on Optimizing CompilersAs already mentioned, many existing and in partiular optimizing ompiler programsh do not hek all pre-onditions neessary for orret ompilation of soure programs.In partiular optimizing transformations often need pre-onditions whih, for pratialreasons, are too hard to deide or are even algorithmially undeidable3. Therefore,in general ompiling speiations C or ompiler program semantis [[ h ℄℄ HL mightyield unreasonable target programs even for well-formed programs for whih additionaloptimization pre-onditions do not hold.Our more elaborated view at orret implementation oers a remedy whih ex-ploits the notion of aeptable errors in ATL. Let us think of a ompiler warning (likefor instane "Warning: array index hek omitted in line ...") as a potential er-ror message, i.e., as an indiation for an eventually generated target program t topotentially belong to the set of aeptable errors in ATL in the following sense: "We[the ompiler℄ give you [the ompiler user℄ the following target program t, but it on-tains optimizations whih require additional pre-onditions   Dsi for your soureprogram to hold. If you annot guarantee , please take this as an error message,beause t might not be orret."That is to say: Besides the usual ompiling speiation C every soure program sarries an additional (optimization) pre-ondition  = PC (s)  Dsi , PC : SL! 2Dsi ,whih leads to a modied soure language semantis[[s ℄℄ SL;PC =def [[s ℄℄ SL [ (Dsi n PC (s))  fpf g ;where pf 2 U so reads as \(optimization) pre-ondition false". Now, if ompiling spe-iation or ompiler program deliver a target program together with an optimizationwarning, then this guarantees a weaker orret implementation of s by t, namelythat (i ; [[t ℄℄ TL) (dsi )  ([[s ℄℄ SL ; o) (dsi ) [ Atoholds for all dsi 2 PC (s) with [[s ℄℄ SL (dsi )  Dsi [ Aso: This weaker notion of orretimplementation (with respet to [[  ℄℄ SL) an equivalently be expressed by usual orretimplementation, but with respet to the weaker semantis relation [[  ℄℄ SL;PC.A well-known optimization is the so-alled redundant (dead) ode elimination, whihmight violate preservation of relative (partial) orretness, e.g., whih might eliminatethe ode that for some input data dsi 2 Dsi would ause a runtime error like for instanea division by zero. The soure program s might be partially (relatively) orret w.r.t.some pre- and post-onditions ~ resp. ~	, whereas the optimized target program tis not. It might return a regular but inorret result if applied to dti 62 i(). Ifthe additional optimization pre-ondition  does not hold for the input, t mightdangerously deeive the user. Its result might have nothing in ommon with anyregular soure program result dso.A dierent optimization is the so-alled unswithing , whih might violate preserva-tion of total (regular) orretness. Unswithing is an optimization that moves ondi-tional branhes outside loops and in partiular hanges the sequential order of ondi-3For many programming languages it is algorithmially undeidable whether or not for instanevariables are initialized before they are used, or if programs terminate regularly.
36 6 RELATED WORK ON COMPILER VERIFICATIONtional expressions while transformingwhile(b; if (; 1; 2)) 7! if (;while(b; 1);while(b; 1)) :This transformation does in general not preserve regular (total) orretness. A pro-ess programmer, who has proved regular (total) orretness of a soure program s(ontaining the left statement) would dangerously be heated by the program t (on-taining an implementation of the right statement instead) if t is applied to input datadti 62 i() suh that b evaluates to true and  auses a runtime error. In that ase,t would inorretly irregularly abort with an error, whih might lead to a dangeroussituation if t ontrols for instane a safety ritial proess.6 Related Work on Compiler VerifiationLet us ask if literature does help in order to prove the three ompiler implementationsteps orret. Atually, we nd intensive work on steps 1 and 2, although often underunrealisti assumptions so that the results have to be handled with are. Step 3 hasnearly totally been negleted. If the phrase \ompiler veriation" is used, then mostof the authors mean step 1. There is virtually no work on full ompiler veriation.Therefore, the ProCoS projet (1989 - 1995) has made a lear distintion betweenompiling veriation (step 1) and ompiler implementation veriation (steps 2 and3). Compiling veriation is part of theoretial informatis and program semantisand work on it has been started by J. MCarthy and J.A. Painter in 1967 [MP67℄.Proof styles are operational [MP67, BR92, BS98℄ or denotational [MS76℄ dependingon how soure language semantis is dened. If a soure language has loops or (fun-tion) proedures, then term rewriting or opy rule semantis is employed throughout[Lan73, LS87℄. Other operational styles split in natural [NN92℄ or strutural [Plo81℄operational or state-mahine-like [Gur91, Gur95℄. Denotational semantis has startedwith D. Sott's work [So70, SS71℄, and typial ompiling orretness proofs an befound in [MS76℄. The authors in [HJS93, Sam93, MO97, MOW00℄ use an algebraidenotational style for learer modular proofs, based on state transformations resp.prediate transformers.Mehanial proofs are often based on interpreter semantis, a further variant ofthe operational style [Sto77℄, and sometimes inlude high level ompiler implementa-tion veriation (step 2) with e.g., HL = Stanford-Pasal [Pol81℄ or Boyer/Moore-Lisp[Moo88, Fla92, Moo96℄ or Standard-ML [Cur93, Cur94℄. M. Broy [Bro92℄ uses theLarh-prover [GG91℄. One should keep in mind, however, that the running theoremprover implementations are, stritly speaking, not ompletely veried. Their orret-nesses again depend on existing orret initial host ompilers, whih are not available upto now. Realling setion 1, hakers might have intruded Trojan horses [Tho84, Goe00a℄via unveried start up ompilers. Hene, we are left on human hekability of mehan-ial proof protools (a-posteriori-proof heking).High level ompiler implementation veriation (step 2) is a eld within softwareengineering. Corret implementation rules have been worked out in many formal soft-ware engineering methods and projets like VDM [Jon90℄, RAISE [GHH+92℄, CIP
37[Bau78, Par90℄, PROSPECTRA [HKB93℄, Z [Spi92℄, B [ALN+91℄, and also the PVS-system [Dol00℄.Literature on low and mahine level ompiler implementation veriation (step 3)is by far too sparse. There are only demands by some researhers like Ken Thompson[Tho84℄, L.M. Chiria and D.F. Martin [CM86℄ and J S. Moore [Moo88, Moo96℄, noonvining realisti methods. Here is the most serious logial gap in full ompilerveriation. Unfortunately, a majority of software users and engineers { as opposed tomathematiians and hardware engineers { do not feel logial gaps to be relevant unlessthey have been onfronted with a ounter-example. So we needA. onvining realisti methods for low level implementation veriation (step 3)B. striking ounter-examples (failures) in ase only step 3 has been left out.Let us rst step into B and hene go on with an initial disurs on the potential risk ofomitting the low level mahine ode veriation step for ompilers.7 The Risk of Negleting Mahine Level VerifiationKen Thompson, inventor of the operating system Unix, stated in his Turing AwardLeture \Reetions on Trusting Trust" [Tho84℄:\You an't trust ode that you did not totally reate yourself. (Espeiallyode from ompanies that employ people like me.) No amount of soure-level veriation or srutiny will protet you from using untrusted ode."He underpinned his statement by skething the onstrution of an exeutable binarymahine ode version of a C-ompiler whih was wrong, although his version suessfullypassed N. Wirth's strong ompiler or bootstrap test [Wir77℄, whih is well-known to beextremely hard to deeive, and although we may even assume that the orrespondingC-version of his ompiler has been veried.Let us assume there exists a binary version 0 of a C-ompiler running on a mahineM0, and a (dierent) C-ompiler 1 written in C generating ode for a mahine M1.A two step bootstrapping proess of 1 on M0 generates a version 3 (of 1), whih isnow formulated in binary M1-mahine ode. If we assume 0 and 1 orret, and themahine M0 to work orretly, then 3 is orret as well [Lan97b, Goe96a, Hof98℄.By a third bootstrapping step of 1, we may ompile 1 to a newM1-binary 4 usingthe ompiler 3 on mahine M1. If we assume the mahine M1 to work orretly aswell, then 4 and 3 are idential [Goe99℄, at least if we assume every involved programdeterministi. The third bootstrapping step (and heking identity of 3 and 4) is N.Wirth's so alled strong ompiler or bootstrap test. It is employed for safety reasons,if at least one of the four above orretness assumptions annot be guaranteed.But let us ome bak to Ken Thompson's senario: He manipulated 0, onstruteda maliious 0 that nally produed a wrong 3, although he followed the entire abovebootstrapping proess and 3 passed the strong ompiler test. Although the ompilersoure program 1 remains orret (unhanged), and even if the mahines M0 and M1work orretly, 3 inorretly translates at least one C-soure program, in his ase theUnix login ommand. He has introdued a Trojan Horse in 0, whih is a very hidden































Figure 20. Wirth's strongompiler test. Note: Even ifM0and M1 are the same mahine,0 and 2 need not neessar-ily generate idential ode. 0and 2 are two dierent ompil-ers. In general, we know noth-ing about 0's target ode.error hard to detet by tests. The manipulation of 0 an even be steered so that 3generates inorret target ode for exatly two C-soure programs [Goe00a℄ { one ofwhih must be the ompiler soure program 1 itself, beause otherwise, due to thestrong ompiler test, 3 would be orret.In any ase, the ruial insight is that all this might happen even if 1 is veried onsoure level [Goe00a, Goe00b℄. Moreover, if the user would try to onvine her/himselfof orretness by a test suite, as this is ommon pratie today, she/he would have tond at least one of the two inorretly ompiled programs among those billions of (andtheoretially innitely many) test andidates.We easily imagine that program validation by test is heavily overharged in aseof ompilers if their generation employs unveried auxiliary software, like 0 in ourase. We should well realize the seurity impat of all this. Virtually every realistisoftware generation basially depends on running non-veried auxiliary software. Sineomputers nowadays are usually onneted to the world wide net, the software is moreor less open to haker attaks, and might already have been manipulated from outside.Fighting seurity attaks auses muh harder problems than avoiding unintentionalbugs (safety). Safety, in a sense, relies on statistially distributed bugs by onstrutors'mistakes or materials' faults, whereas for seurity we have to be aware of subversiveintent.Note that one possible proedure in order to unover the maliious Trojan Horseis to perform the ompiler bootstrap and hene use the ompiler itself as a test ase.But note: this test ase would have to be performed very arefully, whih means thatwe have to run the generated ompiler 3 on 1 and to ompare the result 4 with theexpeted veried result that is given as part of the test suite. We doubt, that anyexisting ompiler binary (like 4) has ever been veried in this sense yet. Atually, thisis one of the essential tasks of the present paper.Unless we verify 3 to be a orret implementation of (the veried) 1, any of theompiler exeutables 0, 2, 3, 4, any further bootstrapped ompiler implementation,and any soure program ompiled by one of these programs might eventually ausedisastrous, even atastrophi eets. We think that this well serves as a striking ounterexample.











abstratsequenes(programs) Figure 21. Steps 1 and 2 for aninitial full orret ompiler imple-mentationAording to step 1 and 2 (setion 3.1, page 18) we develop a orret SL to TL-ompiling speiation C and orretly implement it as a ompiler program SL, now inSL = HL itself.High level syntatial programs in SL' and TL' are SL-data, i.e., s-expression se-quenes. Abstrat syntatial programs in SL and TL are assoiated to SL',TL' bybijetions 'SLSL0 and 'TLTL0 . We formulate C suh that it will relate target programs TLto well-formed soure programs SL at most, i.e., for whih soure semantis [[SL ℄℄ SLare dened. We onstrut SL suh that, if applied to well-formed soure programsin SL', SL, or more preisely [[ SL ℄℄ SL, exeuted on an imagined SL-mahine, will ei-ther terminate suessfully or abort with an aeptable error due to target mahineresoure exhaustion. SL has a pre-ondition that restrits its inputs to representations
40 8 REALISTIC METHOD FOR LOW LEVEL COMPILER GENERATIONof well-formed soure programs. That is to say, SL might not hek for well-formedness;but then, [[ SL ℄℄ SL has to have an unaeptable error outome, perhaps speied non-deterministially, if applied to SL-data that do not represent well-formed SL-programs(see the disussion on CC, page 28). TL0 
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'TL0TL00[[  00SL ℄℄ SL
[[ 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Figure 23. Bootstrapping theinitial ompiler. A suÆientvariant of Wirth's strong om-piler test (a-posteriori-synta-tial ode inspetion) guaran-tees fully orret implementa-tiontation) eventually generates TL, provided that the three ompiler exeutions of 0, 2,and TL suessfully terminate with regular outputs 2, TL, and TL, respetively. SineSL and 0 are assumed orret, and whenever the data abstrations i SLTL  1, o SLTL  1,i SL+TL0  1, and o SL+TL0  1 are single-valued funtions, we have the following bootstrappingtheorem [Lan97b, Goe99, Goe00℄:








TL Figure 24. Bootstrapping an initial ompiler im-plementation 2What an we expet in ase of a suessful ompilation with a regular result 2 re-spetively a representation 20 ? The T-diagrams represent two ommutative diagrams(Figure 25 for 0, and Figure 26 for 1).Sem
TLTL




 [[ 00 ℄℄ HL0 = [[ 0 ℄℄ HL TL0 
 = DHLo 
 3 2010 2 DHLi 
 = SL0 
 Figure 25. Extended viewat Figure 24 (part 1 for 0)Sem
TLTL




 [[ 10 ℄℄ SL0 = [[ 1 ℄℄ SLDSLi 
 = SL 0 
 TL 0 
 = DSLo 
'SLSL 0 Figure 26. Extended view atFigure 24 (part 2 for 1)Moreover, 0 is orret, and the result of applying 0 to 10 is the regular HL-datum 20 2DHLo 
 = TL0 
. Thus, [[ 10 ℄℄ SL0 v [[ 20 ℄℄ TL0 , whih means i ; [[ 20 ℄℄ TL0 w [[ 10 ℄℄ SL0 ; o .Hene, also the diagram in Figure 27 is ommutative and, thus, vertial omposition ofthe diagrams in Figure 26 and in Figure 27 nally yields the following bootstrappinglemma:4We use 1 here instead of SL, beause the following argument works for any orret ompiler soureprogram.
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20 ℄℄ TL0 = [[ 2 ℄℄ TL o = 'TL 0TL 00
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10 ℄℄ SL0 2 SemSL : SL 0 
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20 ℄℄ TL0 2 SemTL : SL 00 
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TLSL Figure 28. If 0 and 1 are orret ompilers,then so is 2Let us start a minor detour and ome bak to the disussion in setion 5.3.3: Theproof of the bootstrapping lemma shows, that the (ompiler generating) ompiler 00needs not be a regularly terminating program for all well-formed input programs inSL' in order to be useful. 00 , applied to a well-formed program SL0 in SL', even to awell-formed ompiler like 10 , might run into an aeptable error in ATL0 = AHLo , perhapsdue to a resoure violation like a memory overow.If 00 terminates regularly, however, then the assoiated regular result 20 in TL' isagain a well-formed and orret SL to TL-ompiler. In other words: Sine we annotexpet 00 to yield regular results for all (arbitrarily large) soure program respresen-tations, 00 will in general be orret in the sense of preservation of relative (partial)program orretness, but not in the sense of preservation of regular (total) orretness(f. setion 4).Thus, the expeted error behaviors of SL-programs and in partiular of 10 and henealso of 20 , on the one hand, might be of quite a dierent nature than, on the otherhand, of SL' and hene in partiular of 00 . SL might even be a proess programminglanguage suh that we expet SL-programs and their implementations in TL to beregularly (totally) orret. If 10 preserves regular (total) program orretness, then sowill 20 , i.e., the result of applying 00 to 10 (f. setion 5.3.3).That is to say: A partial orretness preserving ompiler 00 may well generate atotal orretness preserving ompiler exeutable 20 from a orresponding total orret-ness preserving ompiler soure program 10 . We hene have just given the proof, thatthere is no need for trusted ompilers to be orret in the sense of preservation of total
43orretness. We do not depend on a guarantee of well-denedness while bootstrappingompilers.This ends our detour and we ome bak in partiular to the strong ompiler (boot-strapping) test. Sine SL, restrited to well-formed SL-programs, is deterministi, wealso have the following strong ompiler test theorem (variants an also be found in[Lan97b, Goe99, Goe00℄). Whereas the proof of the bootstrapping theorem (8.1) is asimple appliation of the bootstrapping lemma, the proof of the strong ompiler testtheorem requires a more expliit exploitation of the bootstrapping lemma.Theorem 8.2 (Strong ompiler test theorem). The ompilers TL and TL are equal.Proof. Let SL and 0 play the roles of 1 and 0 in the lemma. We take a representationSL0 of (the well-formed abstrat s-expression) SL. SL0 is also a representation of theabstrat SL+-program SL. SL and SL+ have the same input and output data domains(of onrete s-expression sequenes). SL and SL0 have the same semantis [[ SL ℄℄ SL =[[ SL ℄℄ SL+ = [[ SL0 ℄℄ SL0 = [[ SL0 ℄℄ SL+ 0 .Let 20 be the onrete result of suessfully applying 0 to SL0 on host mahineM0. Due to the proof of the bootstrapping lemma we have the following ommutativediagram: DSL+o 
 = DSLo 
 = TL 0 
[[ 20 ℄℄ TL00 = [[ 2 ℄℄ TL0
[[ SL0 ℄℄ SL+ 0 DTL0o 
 = TL 00 
 3 TL00SL 0 
 = DSLi 
 = DSL+i 
SL0 2 SL 00 
 = DTL0i 
'SL 0SL 00 = iSL+TL0 oSL+TL0 = 'TL 0TL 00Reall that we introdued languages SL" and TL" as reasonable representations of SL,SL' and of TL, TL'. SL and SL' resp. TL and TL' are isomorphi, and the inverses ofiSL+TL0 and oSL+TL0 are single valued funtions.Let TL00 be the onrete suessful result of ompiling SL0 by 20 again on the hostmahine M0. Again, due to the proof of the bootstrapping lemma we haveDSLo 
 = TL 0 
oSLTL = 'TL0TL 00[[ SL0 ℄℄ SL0'SL 0SL 00 = iSLTLSL00 2 SL 00 
 = DTLi 
 DTLo 
 = TL 00 
 3 TL00[[ TL00 ℄℄ TL00 = [[ TL ℄℄ TL
SL 0 
 = DSLi 

Let TL00 be the onrete suessful result of ompiling SL0 by TL00 , now on mahine M.Sine SL is assumed deterministi (whih atually an be guaranteed by onstrution),TL00 and TL00 are representations of one and the same onrete s-expression sequeneTL0 = TL0 in DSL+o = DSLo = TL0 and of TL = TL in the abstrat language TL. utWe an not prove equality of TL00 and TL00 . Equality does in general not hold,beause the ode of TL00 and of TL00 has been generated by two dierent ode generation
44 9 SOURCE LEVEL VERIFICATION IS NOT SUFFICIENTmehanisms of  02 on M0 and of TL0 on M, i.e., on two dierent mahines. Codegeneration of TL00 is inuened by runtime-system ode whih 0, e.g., the existing SL+= ANSI-Common Lisp ompiler running on M0, generates as part of  02, whereas odegeneration of TL00 is inuened by our (the SL runtime-system generated as part of TL00by  02.Let us for instane assume TL00 and TL00 to be harater sequene (string) represen-tations of TL resp. TL. Sine there are dierent orret string representations of oneand the same s-expression, the M0-print routine of  02 might print TL00 dierently tohow TL0 prints TL00 , although both printed represenations are orret with respet tothe idential s-expressions TL0 resp. TL0 .However, we ould add a further bootstrapping step omparing the string results ofTL and TL. Sine we would then use the same print routine, and beause our programsare determinsti, we would nally get equal string representations TL00 = TL00 , if thebootstrap sueeds. For that we exploit that TL00 ; TL00 ; TL;  TL00 are semantially equaland that their string representations represent one and the same s-expression. Here isanother important remark: The loading mehanism on mahine M must not depend ondierent binary (harater sequene) representations TL00 resp. TL00 of TL = TL. Theloader has to load the same abstrat M-mahine program in both ases.In any ase, we ould also start the entire bootstrapping proess by applying 0 onM0 to  00SL00 . Reall that the latter is a version of our ompiler soure program SL whihdoes not print s-expressions (by using the runtime-system of the implementing om-piler) but omprises its own printing routine and hene generates harater sequenes.In that ase, both programs deterministially ompute the same sequene of haratersand we would have  00TL00 =  00TL00 , although the two strings are omputed on dierentmahines: 00TL0 = [[  00SL00 ℄℄ SL+0 ('SL0 1SL00 ( 00SL00) ) = [[  00SL00 ℄℄ SL0 ('SL0 1SL00 ( 00SL00) ) =  00TL0due to determinism of  00SL resp.  00SL00 . But note that this is again only true if we omparethe printed harater sequenes. On binary level, they might for instane be representedin dierent harater odings on M0 and M, say in 8bit-Asii or in 16bit-Uniode.Let us end this setion with the following remark: We are well aware that the pre-vious observations are tedious, umbersome and by far not obvious. But on the otherhand, we have too often seen ompilers generating wrong ode just beause they havebeen bootstrapped or ross-ompiled in a quik-and-dirty proess, forgetting about po-tential ode representation problems like for instane byte order, alignment or evendierent harater odes used on dierent mahines. Fortunately, our rigorous math-ematial treatment of ode generation and ompiler bootstrapping enables to unoverany of these tedious problems and to talk about it preisely.9 Soure Level Veriation is not SuÆientNote, that all this has been proved under the unrealisti assumption that 0 is orret.But there is no guarantee in the situation we are aiming at: We want to onstrut andgenerate an initial (rst) orretly implemented ompiler exeutable. Nevertheless, wean use 0 and 2 as intelligent (and eÆient) tools, and they will often sueed to
45produe the orret result. We just have to assure this fat. This is the key idea of ourapproah to low level ompiler implementation veriation.However, the suessful bootstrap test (TL = TL) does not help. It is well-knownthat it might sueed for inorret ompiler soure programs SL. Just onsider a sourelanguage onstrut, whih is inorretly ompiled but not used in the ompiler itself.Our situation is more deliate: SL is a veried ompiler soure program. Unfor-tunately, we an prove [Goe99, Goe00a, Goe00b℄ even in this ase: Although TL issuessfully generated from the veried SL by threefold bootstrapping and passes thestrong ompiler test, TL is not neessarily orret. Ken Thompson's Trojan Horse,originally hidden in 0, might have survived so that we nd it both in TL and in TL(and also in 2).In [Goe00a, Goe00b℄, we prove this fat mehanially using M. Kaufmann's and JMoore's logi and theorem prover ACL2 [KM94℄. Ken Thompson's Trojan Horse anbe expressed in high level language, even in the lean and abstrat Boyer/Moore-logiof rst order total reursive funtions. We need no ugly mahine ode to onstrut suha maliious program part. The situation is even more deliate if we onsider preeedingor subsequent ompilation phases: If only one phase is orrupted, the only hane tounover that error is to rigorously hek the target ode of exatly that phase, whilethe ompiler exeutable TL (or 2) ompiles SL. No other test will help, unless theuser by aident runs TL on exatly that one additional inorretly ompiled soureprogram that eventually auses atastrophi eets (and waits for the atastrophe tohappen).10 Realisti Method for Low Level Compiler VerifiationLet us now drop our assumption that 0 is orret. Also note that, in general, programsare non-deterministi. By twofold bootstrapping of  00SL resp.  00SL00 on mahine M0 wegenerate an output string s whih is supposed to be a string representation of  00TL. Thisis aording to the rst two steps of Figure 23. Sine 0 and hene 2 might be inorret,we have to make sure with mathematial rigor, that s is indeed a representation of  00TL.Our method of low level ompiler implementation veriation is as follows: Let  00TLbe a program written in TL suh that  00SL C  00TL holds, i.e., let  00SL,  00TL full the ompilingspeiation whih was veried in step 1 (Figure 21). Hene,  00SL's and  00TL's semantisare related by v.
TL00 
 = DSLo 
'TL00TL00  oSLTL[[  00SL ℄℄ SL TL00 
 = DTLo[[  00TL ℄℄ TLiSLTL  'SL00SL00D
SLi 
 = SL00 
DTLi 
 = SL00 

Figure 29. Corret implemen-tation of orret ompiler soureprograms. The extended seman-tis, dened on DSLi 
 resp. DTLi 
,arries an unaeptable error out-ome in U SLi resp. UTLi indiat-ing the ases where inputs do notrepresent well-formed SL- or TL-programs'SL00SL00 , 'TL00TL00 are the natural 1-1-mappings on harater sequenes. How iSLTL, oSLTL are pre-isely dened depends on whih primitive standard input-output-routines are atually
46 10 REALISTIC METHOD FOR LOW LEVEL COMPILER VERIFICATIONused in SL and TL.Sine iSLTL 1 = oSLTL 1 is single-valued, representations of well-formed programs haveunique semantis in SemSL resp. SemTL. Due to vertial omposability (f. setion 4.4,Theorem 4.2),  00TL is a orret SL" to TL"- ompiler orretly implemented in TL. Figure29 aomplishes Figure 21 and 22 (page 39) and yields Figure 2 (page 18) in our speialsituation.Any of our data inluding programs are representable by s-expressions. Thus, wemay assume that any of our soure and target languages L have s-expression-syntaxes,i.e., syntatial programs are s-expression sequenes. Input and output data domainsDLi , DLo are sets of s-expression sequenes as well. Note that haraters are partiulars-expressions, and hene harater sequenes (strings) are partiular s-expression se-quenes. Not every syntatial program (s-expression) is well-formed. In fat, the setof well-formed programs is exatly the domain of denition of the semantis funtion[[  ℄℄ L 2 SemL.Compiling speiations C are often dened by syntatial rules (e.g., by termrewriting), whereas orretness of  00TL is a semantial matter. That is to say: Wehave a redution of the orretness problem from semantis to syntax. The previousparagraphs sketh the proof of the following theorem:Theorem 10.1 (Semantis to Syntax Redution). If s is a string, if  00TL =('TLTL00 ;'TL00TL00) 1 (s) and if syntatial heking of  00SL C  00TL is suessful, then  00TL is a well-formed SL" to TL"-ompiler orretly implemented in TL.It is not in all ases neessary to ompletely verify an algorithm beforehand in orderto trust a omputed result. In the proposed proess for orret ompiler onstrution,we verify SL resp.  00SL a priori (steps 1 and 2), but veriation of TL resp.  00TL (step 3)is an a posteriori syntatial result heking. It allows for using unveried supportingsoftware, e.g., ompilers 0 and 2 on mahine M0. They are used as intelligent butnot neessarily orret type writers. Cheking guarantees to nd any error in  00TL, evenintended errors like viruses or Trojan horses as of setion 7.The idea of a posteriori result heking is old. We an nd appliations e.g., inhigh shool mathematis, like heking division or linear equation solving by (matrix-vetor) multipliation. The idea has found its way to algorithms theory [BLR89℄,trusted ompilation [Lan97a, GH98b, PSS98, HGG+99, GZG99, CGP+97℄, and systemsveriation [GGZ98, PT99, BG01℄ in general.10.1 Realisti Syntatial a-posteriori Code InspetionHowever, sine we know that realisti ompiling speiations and ompilers are oftangible size, we might ask if syntatial a posteriori ode heking is realistiallymanageable. A rst idea might be to look for mahine support, i.e., to write hekingalgorithms and programs. But we should be aware that in this way we might well runinto iruli vitiosi . We burden ourselves with new speiation and (high and mahinelevel) implementation orretness problems for heking algorithms and programs. Ifwe want to implement an initial ompiler fully orretly on a mahine, there is no wayaround some hand heking.Remark: We do not ondemn the use of programmed omputers for proving andproof heking. If a software engineer believes in auxiliary software to be suÆiently
10.1 Realisti Syntatial a-posteriori Code Inspetion 47trustful, she or he is allowed to use it in order to gain more reliable software prodution.However, the software engineer should then make lear whih parts of the auxiliary soft-ware he/she has used and hene relies on although still not being rigorously veriedmodulo hardware orretness. We have shown tehniques how to maliiously harmauxiliary software. It is most important for the IT-ommunity to demonstrate soundand realisti means how to stop suh ever lasting iruli vitiosi. Sine soure ode ver-iation may sueed, and sine manual mahine ode veriation hardly ever will, westrongly believe that providing trustworthy ompiler exeutables is the most promisingsound basis.Verix has introdued [GH98b, Hof98℄ three intermediate languages between SL(ComLisp) and TL (INMOS Transputer- or DEC -ode). Beause it is neessary tonally produe a onvining omplete rigorous proof doument, these languages havepartiularly been hosen in order to isolate ruial ompilation steps and to enableode inspetion by target to soure ode omparison. Essential harateristis andadvantages for ode inspetion are: Languages Li are lose to their preeeding languages Li 1 so that only few ruialtranslation steps are neessary per pass. Translation uses standard tehniques, does only moderately expand and is loalin the sense that it does not reorder orresponding thik ode piees. We avoid optimization; every transition remains well reognizable and loallyhekable w.r.t. CLiLi+1 by juxtaposing orresponding ode. Every language has a proedure or subroutine onept; soure and target pro-grams are modularized by orresponding subroutines.These harateristis will be reeted by our heking (i.e., ompiling speiation andode inspetion) rules in setion 10.2 below. Soure, intermediate and target languagesare:1. High level soure language is ComLisp=SL. Programs onsist of non-nested mu-tually reursive funtion proedures with all-by-value parameter passing. Vari-ables are simple, and data are Lisp-s-expressions. Denotational, operational opyrule resp. stak semantis are well-known [LS87, NN92, MO90, Goe97℄.2. Stak Intermediate Language SIL. Programs onsist of non-nested mutually reur-sive parameterless proedures. Data remain s-expressions. Operators are post-xed (reverse Polish notation), parentheses are dropped, and variables are rep-resented by frame-pointer based stak loations (usually very small relative ad-dresses) intended to implement proedure and operator parameters. Operationalstak semantis is straight forward and easily omparable to the operational SL-semantis.3. C-like intermediate language Cint similar to Java's virtual mahine language. Allvariables are of type integer, ontents are either immediate or referenes into twolinear stak resp. heap arrays. The stak is intended to implement SIL's stak, andthe heap to rene non-atomi Lisp-s-expressions (SIL-data). Every SIL-programan be implemented in Cint with equivalent semantis.4. Assembly language TA. Instrutions are mahine dependent, e.g., Transputeror DEC . Symboli addresses are avoided; subroutines are alled using uniquenumbers, variables have small relative addresses, branhes stay within subroutinebodies and are instrution ounter relative.
48 10 REALISTIC METHOD FOR LOW LEVEL COMPILER VERIFICATION5. Mahine ode TL. Binary or hexadeimal notation of byte ontents with more orless impliit presription of how to load registers and memory of the target ma-hine. The impliit presription is materialized by a small boot program [GH98℄.Only TA and TL are mahine dependent.Semantis of a TL-program TL is given by exeution of the mahine M, after theinstrution ounter has been loaded with the start address of the main part of TL.Memory ells and registers not expliitly mentioned in the loading proess are assumedto ontain arbitrary data, i.e., TL might behave non-deterministially, although eahinstrution works deterministially. TL might in general even overwrite itself. However,the programs we generate will not. In ase we prove preservation of partial orretness,they will instead stop with an error message like \stak overow", \heap overow",\return stak overow" or \arithmeti overow", or due to operator undenednesses.This is guaranteed by ompiling speiation veriation (step 1).10.2 A Closer Look into a-posteriori Code InspetionIn the following we refer to our onrete ompiler implementation from SL=ComLisp tobinary Transputer-mahine ode TL [GH98b, GH98, GH98a℄. The ompiler proeedsin four separate phases. Eah phase is orretly implemented in ComLisp and generatesan external string representation of the intermediate and target programs.TASIL TLCintfront end bak endComLispCheking the entire transformation of a Lisp-program diretly into binary Transputer--mahine ode is unrealisti. We would have to hek, that the hexadeimal represen-tation of the ode for e.g. a funtion denition like(defun f (x y)(+ (* x y) 3))whih ompiles into the Transputer-mahine ode(33 z 4a75 e0 73 75 e1 73 fa d3 75 52 d5 75 74 f9 a2 21 f0 73 58 71f9 a2 21 f0 73 30 73 e4 73 31 73 e5 73 32 73 e6 73 33 73 e744 70 21 3e f6 43 73 e6 43 73 e7 44 70 21 3 f6 73 34 73 e073 35 73 e1 75 60 5e d5 75 31 d3 75 30 f6)is a orret one. Without any further struture of the target ode we would not be ableto do this onsientiously. The vertial deomposition into intermediate languages givesthe neessary struture. We will show this using the onrete output of our ompilerimplementation for the above funtion. It has no higher ontrol strutures (no loopsnor onditionals). This slightly simplies the presentation here beause we will nothave to hek relative jump distanes for the assembly ode.
10.2 A Closer Look into a-posteriori Code Inspetion 4910.2.1 Cheking the Front EndThe rst two ompilation steps are mahine independent. We start with our originalComLisp-funtion and ompile it to SIL. This essentially is the transformation of ex-pressions into postx form. The body is ompiled to x y * 3 +, augmented by relativepositions of variables and intermediate results. The last statement opies the result tothe result stak position 0.(DEFUN f (x y) (DEFUN F(+(*x (_COPY 0 2)y (_COPY 1 3)) (* 2)3 (_COPYC 3 3)) (+ 2)) (_COPY 2 0))Let us ite the ompiling speiation rules whih are neessary to hek that thispartiular soure to target ode transformation has been omputed aording to thespeiation. Note that the software engineer does not even have to understand theode semantially in order to hek this step5. The purely syntatial (but semantiallyveried) ompiling speiation denes heking rules. An average-eduated softwareengineer will not be overtaxed and an obey them in an informal but nevertheless lear,suint and rigorous mathematial proof style.1: CLdef [[ (DEFUN p (p1 : : : pk) f1 : : : fm) ℄℄  def (DEFUN pCLprog [[ f1 : : : fm ℄℄ ;;k( COPY n 0))where (pi) = i  1 for eah i = 1; : : : ; k2: CLprog [[ f1 : : : fm ℄℄ ;;k def CLform [[ f1 ℄℄ ;;k: : :CLform [[ fm ℄℄ ;;kwhere m  13: CLform [[ (p f1 : : : fn) ℄℄ ;;k def CLform [[ f1 ℄℄ ;;k: : :CLform [[ fn ℄℄ ;;k+n 1(p k)4: CLform [[  ℄℄ ;;k def ( COPY  k)where  is a onstant integer, harater,string or symbol NIL or T5: CLform [[ v ℄℄ ;;k def ( COPY (v) k)where v is a loal variable or formalparameter with (v) dened 2 IN05Nevertheless, we will sometimes give omments on the semantis in order to make this presentationmore intuitive and readable.
50 10 REALISTIC METHOD FOR LOW LEVEL COMPILER VERIFICATIONWe present the ompiling speiation rules in the style of a onditional term rewritesystem (for details see [GH98, Hof98℄). Ground terms are s-expressions or s-expressionsequenes from the syntatial domains of soure and target language, i.e., of ComLispand SIL: <program>, <delarations>, <form>, <fname>, <ident>, <operator>,<symbol>, <integer>, <harater>, <string> resp. <program>SIL,<delarations>SIL, <form>SIL. Ground terms are augmented by rewrite variables6and unary rewrite operators like CLdef [[  ℄℄  , CLprog [[  ℄℄ ;;k or CLform [[  ℄℄ ;;k withparameters , , k. Atually,  ontains relative addresses for loal variables andparameters,  maps global variables to \absolute" addresses, and k is the relativeresult position orresponding to the strutural depth of soure expressions. We justpresented those speiation rules neessary for our example.The system of all onditional term rewrite rules together denes multivalued (non-deterministi) operations assoiated to eah rewrite operator, and we understand thesingle rules above to speify that the left hand side ground term set ontains the righthand side set of ground terms by denition (def). This is an inlusion by denition,beause there might be other rules whih apply to the same left hand side pattern.The simple struture of these rules guarantees a simple heking proess beause oftheir ompositionality, order preservation, at most linear expansion and beause rewriteoperator appliations are not nested and proedure boundaries are preserved.The next step is data renement of dynamially typed Lisp-data to a linear memoryarhiteture. Relative addresses are multiplied by 2 (tag and value eld) and opied inpairs. We have to fous on single SIL-statements and ompare them with pairs of targetstatements: In order to opy the ontent of x from relative position 0 to 2, the targetode has to opy the tag eld from 0 to 4 and the value eld from 1 to 5. Operatoralls now beome subroutine alls into the runtime system { ompiling speiationveriation proves that the runtime system proedures are orret operation renementsof the SIL-operators.(DEFUN F (DEFUN F (8)(_COPY 0 2) (_SETLOCAL (_LOCAL 0) 4)(_SETLOCAL (_LOCAL 1) 5)(_COPY 1 3) (_SETLOCAL (_LOCAL 2) 6)(_SETLOCAL (_LOCAL 3) 7)(* 2) (* 4)(_COPYC 3 3) (_SETLOCAL 3 6)(_SETLOCAL 3 7)(+ 2) (+ 4)(_COPY 2 0)) (_SETLOCAL (_LOCAL 4) 0)(_SETLOCAL (_LOCAL 5) 1))Again, we ite the orresponding onditional term rewrite rules from the ompilingspeiation from SIL to Cint :6We use the prex rewrite in order to distinguish rewrite variables from those ranging over programfragments and rewrite operators from program operators.
10.2 A Closer Look into a-posteriori Code Inspetion 511: CSdef [[ (DEFUN p f1 : : : fm) ℄℄  def (DEFUN p (s)CS form [[ f1 ℄℄ : : :CS form [[ fm ℄℄ where s is the maximal stak framelength needed by f1; : : : ; fm2: CS form [[ ( COPY i j) ℄℄  def ( SETLOCAL ( LOCAL 2i) 2j)( SETLOCAL ( LOCAL 2i+ 1) 2j + 1)3: CS form [[ (p i) ℄℄  def (p 2i)4: CS form [[ ( COPYC n i) ℄℄  def ( SETLOCAL  2i)( SETLOCAL n 2i+ 1)where  is the number tagand n is an integerThis ompletes heking the mahine independent front end. The next two steps aremahine dependent. The nal step generates the mahine ode above.10.2.2 Cheking the Bak EndThe rst bak end phase transforms ontrol struture into linear assembly ode withrelative jumps. The generated subroutine body onsists of proedure entry ode, themain part and proedure exit ode, three parts whih are strutured in three lists inthe TA-ode. Entry and exit ode share the same pattern for every proedure. Thisphase also handles resoure restritions of the onrete 32-bit mahine. But this is asemantial issue not to be heked here.In order to hek the main part, we have to ompare single Cint -instrutions withsmall groups of up to four or ve assembly instrutions. For instane, the instrution( SETLOCAL ( LOCAL 0) 4) (the seond line in the Cint -denition) is ompiled to theinstrution sequene LDL 3 LDNL 0 LDL 3 STNL 4 (rst line of the TA-main partbelow). It rst loads the frame pointer, then the ontent of relative position 0, whihafter loading the frame pointer again is nally stored into relative position 4.(DEFUN F ( 8 ) (_DEFCODE F 51(LDL 5 STNL 0 LDL 3 LDL 5STNL 1 LDL 3 OPR 10 STL 3LDL 5 LDNLP 2 STL 5 LDL 5LDL 4 OPR 9 CJ 2 OPR 16 LDL 3LDNLP 8 LDL 1 OPR 9 CJ 2OPR 16)(_SETLOCAL (_LOCAL 0) 4) (LDL 3 LDNL 0 LDL 3 STNL 4(_SETLOCAL (_LOCAL 1) 5) LDL 3 LDNL 1 LDL 3 STNL 5(_SETLOCAL (_LOCAL 2) 6) LDL 3 LDNL 2 LDL 3 STNL 6(_SETLOCAL (_LOCAL 3) 7) LDL 3 LDNL 3 LDL 3 STNL 7(* 4) LDC 4 LDL 0 LDNL 30 OPR 6
52 10 REALISTIC METHOD FOR LOW LEVEL COMPILER VERIFICATION(_SETLOCAL 3 6) LDC 3 LDL 3 STNL 6(_SETLOCAL 3 7) LDC 3 LDL 3 STNL 7(+ 4) LDC 4 LDL 0 LDNL 28 OPR 6(_SETLOCAL (_LOCAL 4) 0) LDL 3 LDNL 4 LDL 3 STNL 0(_SETLOCAL (_LOCAL 5) 1) LDL 3 LDNL 5 LDL 3 STNL 1)(LDL 5 LDNLP -2 STL 5 LDL 5LDNL 1 STL 3 LDL 5 LDNL 0) OPR 6))The involved rules of the ompiling speiation from Cint to TA are the following:1: CCdef [[ (DEFUN f (  ) s1 : : : sn) ℄℄ ' def ( DEFCODE f  (f)(entryode(  ))(CCstmt [[ s1 ℄℄ ';: : :CCstmt [[ sn ℄℄ ';)(exitode)where ' = h ; jstak ij; jheap ijiand  is a subroutine numbering2: CCstmt [[ (f i) ℄℄ '; def LDC i LDL start LDNL  (f) OPR 6where 0  i < 3: CCstmt [[ ( SETLOCAL e i) ℄℄ '; def CCexpr [[ e ℄℄ '; LDL base STNL iwhere 0  i < 4: CCexpr [[ ( LOCAL i) ℄℄ '; def LDL base LDNL iwhere 0  i < In the rst rule,  is the stak frame length of f , and we used  (see also the aboveode) to stress that the proedure entry ode is nearly onstant, i.e., only parameterizedby the number . jstak ij and jheap ij denote the initial stak and heap size. In theseond rule, i is the relative address of the return value position, start ontains thejump table start address,  (f) denotes the (onstant) jump table position of f 's startaddress, and OPR 6 is the GCALL operation, i.e., the subroutine jump. In the third andfourth rule, base ontains the \absolute" stak frame base address and i is the relativeaddress of the variable to be assigned to respetively loaded from.Finally, it is easy to hek that the TA-mnemonis have been transformed orretlyto instrution byte sequenes (f. Figure 30). Note, that in order to understand theode semantially, we additionally would have to know the semantis for instane of theTransputer-operations alled by OPR instrutions. We need not know this informationto perform syntatial heking; the orretness of the ode follows from ompilingveriation, whereas we have to hek the ode for ompliane with the speiation.The TL-module number #x33 = 51 below is a ode module (indiated by the haraterz) that has a length of #x4a = 74 bytes.
10.2 A Closer Look into a-posteriori Code Inspetion 53(_DEFCODE F 51 (33 z 4a(LDL 5 STNL 0 LDL 3 LDL 5 75 e0 73 75STNL 1 LDL 3 OPR 10 STL 3 e1 73 fa d3LDL 5 LDNLP 2 STL 5 LDL 5 75 52 d5 75LDL 4 OPR 9 CJ 2 OPR 16 LDL 3 74 f9 a2 21 f0 73LDNLP 8 LDL 1 OPR 9 CJ 2 58 71 f9 a2OPR 16) 21 f0(LDL 3 LDNL 0 LDL 3 STNL 4 73 30 73 e4LDL 3 LDNL 1 LDL 3 STNL 5 73 31 73 e5LDL 3 LDNL 2 LDL 3 STNL 6 73 32 73 e6LDL 3 LDNL 3 LDL 3 STNL 7 73 33 73 e7LDC 4 LDL 0 LDNL 30 OPR 6 44 70 21 3e f6LDC 3 LDL 3 STNL 6 43 73 e6LDC 3 LDL 3 STNL 7 43 73 e7LDC 4 LDL 0 LDNL 28 OPR 6 44 70 21 3 f6LDL 3 LDNL 4 LDL 3 STNL 0 73 34 73 e0LDL 3 LDNL 5 LDL 3 STNL 1) 73 35 73 e1(LDL 5 LDNLP -2 STL 5 LDL 5 75 60 5e d5 75LDNL 1 STL 3 LDL 5 LDNL 0 31 d3 75 30OPR 6))) f6)The involved ompiling rules from TA to TL are:1: CAdef [[ ( DEFCODE f i b) ℄℄ def (i#x z jj#x )where  = CAbody [[ b ℄℄ and i#x; jj#xdenote hexadeimal representations of i; jj2: CAbody [[ op1 e1 : : : ( : : : ) : : : ( : : : opn en) ℄℄def CAopr [[ op1 e1 ℄℄ : : : CAopr [[ opn en ℄℄3: CAopr [[ op e ℄℄ def prex (assemble op(op); e)In the seond rule, CAbody ignores the list (parentheses) struture, and in the thirdrule we apply two auxiliary funtions: assemble op translates the 16 basi transputerinstrution mnemonis to hexadeimal digits '0' up to 'f' aording to the tablein Figure 30, and prex generates the px/nx-hains neessary to load the value ofe, whih is in partiular very easy for small non-negative numbers between 0 and 15(representable by a four bit nibble).That is to say: In order to hek the nal ode generation step, we only need toknow the 16 instrution mnemonis, their mapping to instrution ode nibbles, and thepx/nx-hains neessary to load large operands. So for instane LDC 4 is transformedto 44 whih loads the onstant 4 into Areg, whereas LDNL 28 is ompiled into thepx-hain 21 3, whih will exeute LDNL on 16  1 + 12 = 28.10.2.3 The Complete Proof StrutureThis ends the more detailed look into the harateristis of our tehnique of a-posteriori-ode inspetion by omparing orresponding ode parts of the respetive soure andtarget programs and heking them to be in onformane with the ompiling speia-tion rules.
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1 byte = 2 nibbles
opcode operand
Instruction Register
Direct Operation CodesWord Length (e.g. 4 bytes = 32 bits )
Figure 30. Transputer-arhiteture and diret funtion odes. The Transputer-stateonsists of the registers Areg, Breg and Creg, whih form a mini stak with top Areg, theoperand register Oreg, the instrution pointer (program ounter) Iptr, the workspaepointer Wptr, various ags like the ErrorFlag, some more registers and the memoryMem. The registers ontain Word valued quantities. The memory is byte or wordaddressable.In order to ome bak to the overall proof struture, note that program fragmentslike those of the previous setion have been generated for the entire ompiler usingfour unsafe initial ompiler implementations produed by 0 on mahine M0 for bothfront-end and both bak-end phases.The following large diagram (Figure 31) shows all four subompiling speiationsCLi 1Li , all four hand-written subompiler implementations  00i;SL =  00i;L1 and all 16 = 44sub-ompilers  00i;Lj generated and printed out by bootstrapping. The speiationsare veried by ompiling veriation (step 1), the  00i;SL by high level implementationveriation (step 2) and the  00i;Lj for j > 1 by low level implementation veriation(step 3), atually by heking  00i;Lj 1 CLj 1Lj  00i;Lj (13)whih is exatly what we skethed in the previous setion and whih we proved to besuÆient due to the semantis to syntax redution Theorem 10.1.However, it is not neessary to perform all those umbersome hekings. In partiular,unpleasant low level (mahine) ode inspetions below the diagonal are redundant:Sine CTATL and  004;SL are orret (steps 1 and 2), and sine  004;TL is heked to be orretlyompiled to TL,  004;TL is a fully orret TA to TL-ompiler exeutable. We an use itto orretly ompile  003;TA to a orret  0003;TL, whih guarantees  0003;TL to be a fully orretCint to TA-ompiler exeutable, and so forth.That is to say: We load the orret ompiler  004;TL (atually  004;TL00) into mahine Musing the boot program. Corretness of that program means and hene guarantees thatit follows the expliit and impliit loading presriptions of  004;TL00 . Then we start theloaded ompiler in M and let M read  003;TA00 . If M terminates suessfully (regularly),then due to Bootstrapping Theorem 8.1 the output is a orret ompiler  0003;TL (atually
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[[  004;TL ℄℄TL[[  004;TA ℄℄TA
'00TL[[  004;SIL ℄℄ SIL[[  001;SL ℄℄ SL
[[  002;TA ℄℄TAFigure 31. Speial bootstrapping with four ompiler phases. '00L =def ('LL0 ; 'L0L00). 0003;TL00) as well, not neessarily idential to  0003;TL, but aording to CTATL .We an now onatenate  0003;TL ;  004;TL00 (atually  0003;TL00 ;  004;TL00) and obtain a orretompiler exeutable from Cint" to TL" due to omposability of ommutative diagrams(Theorem 4.3). If we proeed, this proess will nally generate the desired orretompiler exeutable from SL" to TL". 000TL00 =  0001;TL00 ;  0002;TL00 ;  0003;TL00 ;  004;TL00 (14)Here we exploit Verix 's hardware orretness assumption for veried low level om-piler implementation (step 3). Note that we have impliitly introdued a (syntatial)onatenation operator \;" for sequential programs, whih orresponds to partiularsequential omposition. Its semantis is obvious. Any of our languages allows for thesyntatial onatenation of programs.The ompilers  00i;SL ontain a parser for s-expression sequenes, namely the imple-mentation of read-sequene. It is part of the runtime system, and so far, it hasto be heked down to the diagonal, in partiular and unfortunately also as part of 004;TL resp.  003;TA in mahine ode. However, there is a remarkable hane to reduethe a posteriori ode inspetion work load onsiderably: Sine the print-routines areheked down to mahine ode TL as well, we may in priniple hek the (onsider-ably larger) read-routines by (trusted) printing of their results, i.e., we may look atthe parser read-sequene as an additional initial ompiler phase  000;SL. Then we onlyneed its orret implementation as a high level SL-program and no further low levelimplementation veriation. In that ase, however, unheked ode runs initially, andwe need further preaution7, namely to validate the intermediate mahine state afterrunning the ode of read-sequene. We an exploit the proessor's memory protetionmehanism and add a few validations (runtime-hekings) to suÆiently guarantee therelevant part of the intermediate state not to be orrupted. In later work we shallreport on this and give the neessary proofs.7Unfortunately, it seems again not to be suÆient to ompare the initially loaded and the generatedode to be idential (f. setion 7).
56 11 CONCLUSIONS11 ConlusionsAt the end of our expose we would like to answer the question raised in the title ofthis essay: Will informatis be able to justify the onstrution of large omputer basedsystems? We will trae again the main lines of thought whih nally lead us to a ratherondent answer: Yes. In fat, internal misbehaviors and intended external violations ofomputer based systems need not last forever, i.e., safety and seurity might reover.However, this will not work out unless software prodution and informatis sienearefully enough solves the following problem: At the end it is the exeutable binaryreal world proessor ode, and not only high level speiations and programs, whihhas to be guaranteed to behave orretly as required (setions 1.3,1.4,1.5 and 2).Realisti software prodution employs and relies on ompilers for high level lan-guages, like for instane C, C++, Ada, Java or Common Lisp. C is very lose tomahine level, but in our ontext it must be seen as a high level language with veryritial and deisive ompilation steps towards real proessor ode (setion 1.4).Of ourse, many onstrutors of realisti ommerial and industrial ompilers aredoing a quite good job. They are about orret ompiling speiation and orretompiler implementation by high level systems programs or by sophistiated rule setsfor term or graph rewrite systems. But there has been bluntly no industry orientedresearh or development of tehniques to implement high level written ompilers suhthat their exeutable binary host mahine versions are guaranteed to generate (at most)orret target mahine ode (setion 6).Again and again, the reason for trouble is the use of unveried auxiliary softwarelike tools and in partiular ompilers, the use of so-alled software of unertain pedigree(SOUP, [JBFB01℄). There are many examples, for instane inorret implementationsof theorem provers or of ryptographi protools. Atually, even if we (unrealistiallywould) assume that ompiler onstrutors have been verifying their ompiler programsperfetly on soure level, ompiler implementations have been and are still produedby a now over 40 years lasting unsafe bootstrapping proess using unveried ompilerimplementations to generate unveried ompiler implementations.In ontrast to mathematiians, and also to hardware engineers, software engineersare often not so muh impressed by logial gaps, espeially not by those evoked by un-veried ompilers whih passed Wirth's strong ompiler test. Software onstrutors liketo transfer suh logial gaps into Wittgenstein's domain of logial septiism, arguingthat no way of reasoning will ever lead towards onvining solutions (setion 6).But unveried ompilers are well outside Wittgenstein's domain and they bear realrisks (as shown by Ken Thompson [Tho84℄ and later by ourselves [Goe99, Goe00a,Goe00b℄). Meanwhile, sine omputers use to be onneted to world wide networks,we an unfortunately not give any guarantee for any of our programs used (setion 7).Atually, rumors say that a omputer does not survive un-haked for more than abouteight hours ontinuous onnetion to the internet. The risk inreases, and omputersiene will be aounted for providing solutions.The Verix -projet oers industry oriented methods to solve the foundational prob-lem of trusted program implementation, namely to produe realisti initial ompilersfor diligently hosen but nevertheless realisti programming languages, ompilers thatrun orretly and hene trustworthily on real host proessors and generate orret andhene trustworthy binary ode for real target proessors (setions 4 and 8 to 10). Our
57partiular tehnique for low level ompiler implementation veriation is new. It is asophistiated diagonal method of so-alled syntatial a-posteriori-ode inspetion, avariant of rigorous a-posteriori-result heking (setion 10).One we have got an initial orretly implemented ompiler exeutable, we maysafely (mehanially) bootstrap further orret ompiler implementations for instanefor more omfortable languages (Bootstrapping lemma and theorem, setion 8). Even ifthe bootstrapping ompiler preserves partial orretness, it is perfetly able to generateorret ompiler exeutables whih preserve total orretness. In fat, this is a veryimportant point for software engineers and proess programmers interested in trustedimplementation of safety ritial embedded real-time systems.It is by no means neessary, that the language SL we have hosen for trusted om-piler bootstrapping is a perfet systems programming language. Compilers for lan-guages with more elaborated data types, nested and even higher order proeduresand/or funtions, objet-orientation and inheritane et. an safely be bootstrapped.SL and its initial orret ompiler implementation are hosen both to be useful toolsand to onsientiously provide a high level proof doumentation for orret low levelbinary ode generation. Informatiians an hek their proof doumentation rigorouslyeven without deep mathematial eduation. Moreover, if we assume hardware to workas desribed in the instrution manuals, then a lot of unpleasant low level heking iseven redundant due to our diagonal tehnique (setion 10).The usual proedure, i.e., to inrementally step up in a hierarhy of abstrationsby onstruting and/or implementing higher level (programming or speiation) lan-guages safely (orretly) on the lower level, does not work for initial orret ompilerexeutables. The reason is, that mahines, their physis, net lists and even their ma-hine languages are too low level in order to adequately express and to onsientiouslyreason about their program behaviors semantially. Our proedure to drive orretnessdown towards the real physial mahine is, and has to be, of a harateristially dier-ent nature, namely to express and to verify realisti orret ompilation semantiallyon the upper level rst, and then to bridge the gap towards the real mahine \in a bigstep". Fortunately, it turns out that our tehniques still allow to exploit the modular-ization in appropriate steps of onretization. In fat, our intermediate languages andthe four ompiler phases are arefully hosen exatly in order to make this possible.Theoretial basis of ompiler orretness is the notion of orret relative imple-mentation whih Verix has developed and whih is muh more exible than lassialorret implementation (setions 4 and 5). Software engineering theory stresses preser-vation of total program orretness, but E. Borger is right in his remark (Boppard,Germany, 1998): \In the past, the role of regular termination has been exaggerated insoftware engineering." Programs need not be proved never to fail in order to be useful.They might end in aeptable errors, and we are \sensible enough" to give a guaranteethat suh errors will be signaled and hene deteted while programs are exeuted. Onthe other hand, if errors annot be deteted, for instane for undeidability reasons,they are unaeptable and thus the user has to avoid (irumvent) them by hoosingappropriate inputs. We want to admit that this is kind of sophistiated. However,realisti software engineering requirements are sophistiated trade-os between a lotof inherently dierent wishes inluding for instane eÆieny as well. The importantpoint is that our results allow, for the rst time in this ritial area, to mathemati-ally rigorously formulate and to formalize and prove suh realisti requirements to be
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